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PREFACE
The following thesis aims at discerning the attitudes 
of Sir Bartle Frere as a guide to British colonial and admin­
istrative thought during the Victorian Period. By doing 
this, it becomes possible to ascertain the impact of the 
administrator on British colonial' and foreign policy.
Appreciation for help in preparing this thesis must 
go first of all to Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, who provided 
the inspiration and did so much to guide it to a fruitful 
conclusion. Dr. Frederick Adrian is to be thanked for his 
helpful criticism of the text. Mrs. Elizabeth Laird of The 
G-ene Eppley Library must be accorded a special tribute for 
the help she gave in procuring many of the works used. 
Finally, there is my wife, Sheila, who did the typing 
throughout.
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CHAPTER I
SIR BARTLE FRERE— A SUMMARY OF HIS LIFE1
Henry Bartle Edward Erere was born on 29 May 1815 in
Brecknockshire, Wales. Following early schooling at Bath, he
entered the East India Company college at Haileybury in 1832
to prepare for a career as a Company servant in India. At
Haileybury, Frere was imbued with the economic philosophy of
the day, which stipulated that the correct method of economic
development was free trade, with the least possible govern-
2ment interference. Haileybury also instilled in its students 
a belief in the more,! and political superiority of Br.^' Lish 
rule in India. Territory under che control of the British 
East India Company at that time was extensive. It included 
the entire east coast, the west coast,, from Goa to Travancore, 
and Bombay with its island of Salsette. The Ganges valley
. i -
to the Upper Jumna, with the exception of Oudh, was under
1Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter 
has been taken from Robert Kennanay Douglas, f!Frere, Sir 
Henry Bartle Edward,11 Dictionary of National Biography. VII, 
697-706. Hereinafter referred to as D . N . B .
^John Straehey, The End of Empire (New York: Random
House, 1959), 56.
^George D. Bearce, British Attitudes Towards India. 
1784-1858 (Oxford: University Press, 196l), 122.’ Herein­
after referred to as Bearce, Attitudes.
its sway. The Sind was annexed in 1834 and the Punjab in 
1849-^* In 1834 Prere assumed his first position in-the 
Company’s ranks as a writer in the Bombay Presidency. A 
year later he became an assistant revenue commissioner.
The career of Bartle Prere in the years from 1842 to 
1866 was a story of great success, tarnished by failure at 
the last moment, as he rose in the hierarchy of Indian govern­
ment. It was his good fortune to become personal secretary 
to the Governor of the Bombay Presidency, Sir George Arthur, 
in 1842. Since Sir George was new to his post and inexperi­
enced, his secretary soon found himself in a highly responsible 
position. This was especially helpful, as he became quite 
conversant with the administration of the Sind, where he was 
later Chief Commissioner. Prere was an adviser to the Eahaj 
of Sattara from 1846 to 1849. During his tenure there, he 
supported such projects as irrigation and the building of 
the first tunnel in India. The annexation of Sattara by the 
British in 1849 propelled him into the position of Area 
Commissioner. Prere was Chief Commissioner of the Sind from 
1850 until 1859, a position in which he showed considerable 
administrative ability; by pacifying what had once been a 
rather turbulent province, he turned it into a showcase of
i
British reform. The Indian Mutiny which broke out in 1857
^Sir Llewellyn Woodward, The Age of Reform. 1815—187.01 
Vol. XIII of The Oxford History of England ed. by Sir George 
Clark (15 vols.; 2nd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936-1965),
403, 421-22, 425-26.
5hardly affected the Sind, which sent relief to the more 
threatened areas in India, especially beleagured Multan.
Frere received the thanks of Parliament and was made a Knight 
Commander of the Order of the Bath. Recognition of his 
ability led to nomination as the first civil service member 
from outside Bengal to the Governor's Council in 1859. He 
continued in this post until his appointment as Governor of 
Bombay in 1862. It was in Bombay that he faced the first 
storm of his career, which until then had been a placid ascent 
in the hierarchy of the Government of India. The economy 
there had experienced a sudden burst of prosperity when the 
American Civil War brought about a desperate need for cotton 
to supply the factories of England. The Bank of Bombay became 
involved and vastly overextended its credit. Its fall in 
1866 led to charges that the Governor of Bombay had not held 
enough control over the situation, and Sir Bartle was removed 
the following year.
His removal from the Bombay governorship was not a 
complete cashiering for Sir Bartle Frere. He was subsequently 
appointed to the India Council in England. Frere began to 
redeem a tarnished reputation. When he returned in 1872 from 
a successful effort to induce the Sultan of Zanzibar to ban 
the slave trade, there was a seat awaiting him on the Privy
^Alfred LeRoy Burt, The Evolution of the British 
Empire and Commonwealth from the American Revolution (Boston: 
i).C. Heath and Company, 1956), 429-30. Hereinafter referred 
to as Burt, Evolution.
Council. Soon thereafter he was selected to accompany the 
Prince of Wales on a tour to India. Upon his return, in May 
1876, from a most successful tour, he was awarded a baronetcy 
and the rank of Grand Commander of the Order of the Bath.^ In 
view of Sir Bartle*s wide experience as an administrator and 
the esteem in which he was held, it was natural that he could 
not go into isolation upon retirement. That same year, there­
fore, he was appointed Governor of Cape Colony and High 
Commissioner for South African native affairs by Lord Carnarvon, 
the Colonial Secretary. What Carnarvon specifically had in 
mind in appointing Prere was a confederation of the South 
African states on the Canadian model.
Three problems presented themselves immediately upon 
Frere*s arrival at the Cape: a Kaffir war; Boer unrest
resulting from the annexation of the Transvaal by Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone; and the Zulu threat to Natal. Prere 
dealt with each in turn. The possibility of a Kaffir war 
led him to go to King William*s Town on the eastern frontier 
to talk with the leading protagonist, Kreli. The latter was 
in no mood to talk and Prere returned empty-handed. A full- 
fledged war soon followed when the Kaffirs attacked a tribe 
friendly to the British, the Pingos. Subsequently put down 
by Sir Arthur Cunynghame and General Thesiger, it resulted 
in a constitutional crisis in the Cape Colony. Sir Bartle 
was unable to work with the Molteno Ministry and called upon 
Sir Gordon Sprigg to form a new government.
The Zulu threat soon began to take up most of Prerefs 
time. Ascending the Zulu throne in 1872, Cetewayo found him­
self in disagreement with the Transvaal over territory claimed 
by the latter. A commission studying' the case found that the 
Zulu claim was the valid one. When Prere made the award, 
however, he attached certain conditions. These demands were 
not met within a thirty-day time limit, and the task of 
enforcement was delegated to General Thesiger. The British 
invaded Zululand in January 1879 and were defeated at 
Isandhlwana. It was not the last word from the British, 
however, and they avenged their defeat the following July at 
Ulundi.
In the Transvaal, meanwhile, dissident Boers were on 
the verge of revolt. They were especially dissatisfied with 
the indifferent treatment accorded their deputations to 
London in 1877 and 1879. Prere met the Boers at Pretoria 
in April 1879, promising that their complaints would be con­
veyed to London with a recommendation that they be rectified. 
The British Government of Benjamin Disraeli, however, was 
not happy with Frere*s handling of native affairs. Public 
and Parliamentary criticism and the approaching elections 
led to censure and loss of his authority as High Commissioner. 
He was finally recalled in July 1880 with the change of 
government in Britain.
The years from 1880 until his death on 29 May 1884 
saw Sir Bartle Frere generally ignored by men of both parties.
He busied himself, however, with speaking engagements before 
various educational, religious, and institutional gatherings. 
He was also, for a time, President of the Royal Asiatic 
Society and was awarded an honorary LL.D from the University 
of Edinburgh. After his death, the Prince of Wales unveiled 
a statue of him on the Thames embankment.
The career of Sir Bartle Prere in the British
colonial service spanned a period of forty-six years.
Governor of both Bombay and the Cape Colony, he also served
as High Commissioner for South Africa. This was enough to
include him in a group of only thirty-seven governors who,
as one writer has observed, nmight be called ’hard-core1
professionals . . .  /cfominating7 mid-nineteenth-century
6colonial service." Only six, however, have received 
adequate biographical treatment, and Prere has not been one 
of them. This study is an attempt partially to remedy this 
fact, concentrating on Prere as the colonial administrator.
It examines, largely through source material, his ideas on 
colonial matters in order to gain an understanding of the 
attitudes, and their roots, prevalent among colonial admin­
istrators of the Victorian Period. It also aims, in the 
process, to clarify the role of the colonial administrator 
in that particularly Victorian concept "imperialism."
John W. Cell, British Colonial Administration in the 
Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Policy-Making Process- (New Haven
Yale University Press, 1970), 49#
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN INDIA
Between 1820 and 1853, Great Britain moved towards a
wholehearted endorsement of free trade, and began to remove
impeding barriers. This policy was espoused in India by a
group of utilitarians, humanists, liberals, and Christian
reformers concerned with India’s progress; they believed
that free trade was the best way to promote the welfare of
India at that time.- They based their hopes on the infusion
of capital into India, for without the roads, public works,
steam navigation, and planting of crops such as cotton, tea
2and tobacco, free trade would be stemmed. Not until the 
1850s, however, did capital finally move into India as part 
of an Empire-wide movement. Investment on public worKi alone
increased from an aggregate of £250,000 in 1850 to £4,000,000
in 1854, and the Indian Government created a public works 
department to handle the surge. Politically, this period
^C. R. Pay, "The Movement Towards Pree Trade," The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire (8 vols.; Cambridge,
England: University Press, 1929-1963), II, 338-414. Herein­
after referred to as C. H. B. E .
2
Bearce, Attitudes. 214-16.
J.. Habakkuk, "Pree Trade and Commercial Expansion 
1853-1870," C. H. B. E .. II, 751-805, 788-89.
ehas been termed the 11 Age of Dalhousie,t! after the Governor- 
General of India (appointed in 1848) who pushed so hard for 
improvements basic to the policy of free trade in I'xdia.^
The dissolution of the East India Company in 1858 did not 
impede the further development of public works*.9
Bartle Prere, as a British administrator in India 
during this period, expressed the predominant attitude of 
free trade. Upon leaving the Sind in 1859, he stated:
”1 have endeavoured to pursue the same policy in all 
matters affecting commerce, regarding Government inter­
ference and Government imposts as in themselves serious 
evils, and believing it to be the appropriate function 
of Government simply to protect all men in the enjoyment 
of their rights and possessions as long as they do not 
interfere with the rights and possessions of others, 
and to remove all obstacles, natural or artificial, to 
such enjoyment; it has been my study not to develope 
commerce and industry, but tOgleave commerce and industry 
free to develope themselves.”
Prere repeated this theme four years later, when Sir Charles
Trevelyan requested his opinion on the disposition of an
expected £1 million surplus in the Indian Government's budget.
Sir Bartle emphatically recommended construction ox roads and
canals to fuel Indian prosperity. Utility was not the only
reason for his interest in such projects as irrigation. He
^Bearce, Attitudes. 220-25.
5C. H. B. E .. V, 318.
John Martinaau, Jhe Life and Oorreainonaenoe of Sir 
Bartle Prere (2 vols.; London: John Murray, 1895), I, 289-90.
Hereinafter referred to as Martineau, Prere.
3was once asked why he espoused its cause so heartily, to 
which he replied: "’If you had seen men’s bones as I have,
lying unburied by the roadside, and on entering a village had 
found it untenanted by a living person, you would understand 
why. "'7
A better understanding of the emphasis laid by Prere 
on British public works in India is gained by examination of 
its most important aspects. Roads, for instance, had never 
been important prior to the arrival of the British, mainly 
because the Indian plains were traversable by cart; in any 
case, neither military nor civilian transport was attempted
Q
in the rainy season. Construction of the Grand Trunk Road
from Calcutta to Peshawar, started in 1839, signaled a new
effort to upgrade the Indian road system in order to speed
9the country’s development. The description Bartle Prere 
gave of roads in the Sind presented a before and after 
picture of British road construction. "’There was not*f” he 
wrote, n,a mile of bridged or of metalled road, not a masonry 
bridge of any kind--in fact, not five miles of any cleared
^Prere to Sir Charles Trevelyan (28 January 1863), 
Ibid. 402, 415.
Q
Great Britain, Sessional Papers (House of Commons), 
’’East India CImprovements in Administration),” XLIII, 1857- 
1858, 22. Hereinafter referred to as B. S. P .
^Sir Percival Griffiths, The British Impact on India 
(n.p.: Archon Books, 1965), 420-21. Hereinafter referred to 
as Griffiths, Impact,
10
road.'”X^ The situation soon changed. Road construction
mileage was 126 in 1851, and increased to 207 in 1852. In
the frontier districts alone, from 1853 to 1860, 1,872 miles
of road were constructed and 11’furnished with 786 masonry
bridges, 88 of which, across navigable canals, were passable
12by boats of the largest sizes.'” Prere described the roads
he observed in the Upper Sind as being forty feet in width,
and all of those constructed within the last two years
/during his connnissionershijg7 generally run in perfectly
straight lines from village to village.1” The 159 bridges
constructed for this road network were "'built of burnt brick,
with mud cement and semicircle arches. The largest . . .  was
a three-arch bridge, the centre arch of twenty-four feet and
13two side arches of eight feet each.'" ^
While Governor of Bombay, Sir Bartle Prere grappled 
with problems resulting from the lack of good roads. Pever 
often accompanied deficiencies in road and harbor facilities,
T A
because food and clothing were in short supply. Prere, 
however, had a deep interest in roads in the Presidency for 
reasons beyond this. In 1860, the British imported only
^Minute 23 September 1861. Martineau. Prere. I.
92,
1XIbid. 107.
X^Minute 14 August 1861, Ibid. 109-10.
X^Prere to Lord Falkland (28 April 1853), Ibid, 108.
X^Frere to Sir Charles Wood (22 February 1863),
Ibid. 408.
seven per cent of their cotton from India; the American Civil 
War increased this figure to two-thirds of the amount used 
by British manufacturers*  ^ Prere never doubted India’s 
ability to supply Britain in cotton, but there were problems 
to be met. ”'If the demand for cotton continues, there can 
be no doubt we can supply all you want. . . .  We have been
backward in improving our roads and river navigation; but,
16I trust we have turned over a new leaf in this respect.’n 
A description he gave of the North Canara area illustrated 
the problem faced:
"It has a magnificent back country, embracing . . . 
our best cotton, coffee, and betelnut districts, with 
forests of the finest timber, and a rich and very 
civilized coast population. It only wants roads. . . . 
^The present ones/ are already covered with traffic 
to an extent whi*ch the road-makers could never have 
expected.
By not providing roads, the British went one step further in
penalizing themselves: railroads would remain unprofitable
18and the sale of British manufactures lag. Even so, Bartle 
Prere felt that the railroads by. themselves did allow the 
Bombay merchants to get into the interior and bring out
15C. H. B. E .. II, 774-75.
Frere to Bourchier (6 October 1861), Martineau, 
Prere, I, 399. Also 12 August 1862 (Bombay), Balkrishna 
Nilaji Pi+alls, ed., The Speeches and Addresses of Sir H. B, E. 
Prere (Bombay, 1870), 231-32. Hereinafter referred to as 
Pitale. Speeches.
^Prere to Lord Elgin (20 February 1863), Martineau, 
Prere, I, 406.
18Ibid, 407.
12
cotton; the resulting facilitation of commercial travel more
19than offset the cost of the railroad.
Fx’ere believed, as already noted above, that the
great need in India, besides roads, was canals. When the
British arrived, they had found the existing canals in sad
shape due to neglect. An investigation of the canal system
in 1850 led to the decision to put the entire program under
one uniform plan with a public works department in each of
the Presidencies. The Indian Government had a separate
20department of its own. Prere probably had this example in
21mind when he created a public works department in the Sind.
Building the canals was a more complicated matter. Two
approaches were tried in the Sind, both often using dry
river beds. The first method utilized perennial channels,
with dams diverting water to the desired location; the
second method, inundation, used the flooded Indus to irrigate
the land. The latter method predated the arrival of the
British, while the former was an exclusively British innov- 
22ation. While Prere was in the Sind, both methods were 
used. The first was employed to divert water from the
*^12 August 1862 (Bombay), Pitale, Speeches. 234.
20B. S. P., "East India (1-rprovements in Admin­
istration )7n_lLTTl, 1857-1858, 20, 25.
p -i
Martineau, Prere. I, 117.
22Sir William Hunter, The Indian Empire: Its Peoples.
History, and Products (3rd ed.; New York: AMS Press, 1966),
629-30• Hereinafter referred to as Hunter, Empire.
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Indus into the Eastern Narra, which was often dry. Inun­
dation was used with the Bigarri Canal which was deepened 
23and widened. ■ Frere described the result of this work in a 
letter of 10 June 1851# It brought both prosperity to the 
people of the region and increased revenue to the G-overnment. 
Frere also believed that the Indians would be more friendly 
towards the G-overnment because the improvements would give
O A
" 1 subsistence to many thousands.1H
Two areas in the Bombay Presidency in critical need
of canals were Guzerat and the Deccan. During good years
when rainfall was normal, water was taken from wells in
25Guzerat and tanks in the Deccan for irrigation. Sir Bartle
Frere described what could happen if there was a dry period:
"Last monsoon the rains failed us in the Deccan and 
Candeish, and we had to . . . /provide/ relief by famine 
works, etc. They are provinces in which irrigation pays 
well, and where, . . .  it must be done by Government.
I inquired how much we had spent on new irrigational 
works within the last ten years, and found it was about 
£7,000, positively not more than £700 a year in a country 
larger than Scotland."2®
The normal procedure in guarding against inadequate rainfall
was the use of dams. They impounded water in the hill valleys
27and allowed its distribution by channels. The most important
^Martineau, Frere, I, 119-20. Also B. S. P .. "East 
India (Improvements in Administration),11 XLIII, 1857-1858, 21.
^^Martineau, Frere. I, 117-18.
^Hunter, Empire, 630.
26Martineau, Frere. I, 414.
2^Hunter, Empire. 630.
measure taken in this area while Frere was in Bombay was the 
damming of the Moola River. This created a lake some twelve 
miles long and helped supply Poona and 86,000 acres of
28surrounding land with water for drinking and irrigation.
One of Bartle Frerefs constant interests while in 
the Sind was the port of Karachi and its improvement. He 
found no docks at all upon his arrival there. The Indus 
River steamers had to go to Bombay for repairs, and in a 
seven year span three vessels had been lost on the trip, 
including the newest and largest, the Falkland. It was 
obvious to Frere that the port of Karachi was needed both as 
an all-weather port for ships on the Sind coast and as a 
means of shortening the distance between northwestern India 
and Europe. He was incessant in recommending modern facil­
ities for the port, continuing his interest while Governor 
29of Bombay. It was during this time that criticism by the 
new engineer superintending the Karachi improvement works 
threatened to bring the whole program to a halt. This raised 
Frere*s ire, inciting him to complain that he was "1ashamed 
to write to Englishmen of this nineteenth century on the 
general advantages of harbours, or to discuss the money value 
of a good harbour as compared with a bad one.,!1^  A Karachi
^^Martineau, Frere, I, 416.
^Minute 23 September 1861, Ibid. 92-99.
^Frere to Captain Eastwick (22 May 1866), Ibid. 98.
15
Port Trust was finally created in 1880 to expand and modernize
*51
the port’s facilities. A good index of the effectiveness 
of improvements of this type was contained in an account 
given by Prere showing that seaborne trade nearly tripled 
from the years 1853-54 to 1857-58. The number of sailing 
vessels entering Karachi harbor had risen from one to fifty- 
seven in the years from 1851 to 1857-58.^
Steamers from Britain steadily increased their range 
throughout the years from 1825 to 1853» until they reached 
Australia the latter year. ^ Prere believed that in addition 
to railroads, steamers would help the port of Karachi. He 
roundly ch'astised the decision of the Bombay authorities to 
turn down an offer by the Steam Navigation Company in June 
1855 for a Bombay-Karachi mail service every two weeks. It 
was, in his opinion, a "’very serioi^ .s discouragement to the 
development of the commercial resources of this port /Karachi^11 
among other things, he believed it would have facilitated 
light freight and reduced the hardship of the overland route 
on invalids and others. Though Frere had lost one battle, he 
still fought for his idea by next endorsing, while in Calcutta 
in 1862, an attempt by William Mackinnon to obtain a subsidy 
from the Indian Government. The subsidy would allow Mackinnon 
to operate steamer service for ports stretching from Calcutta
31C. H. B. E .. T. 263.
Frere to Seymour (17 March 1859), Martineau, Frere.
I, 285,
330. H. B. B.. II, 411-12.
to Karachi. Opposition by the Bombay Presidency meant, however, 
that the plan had to be held in abeyance until 1863 when Prere 
became Governor and ended any opposition to it.
Rail construction in India traced its beginnings back 
to 1848 and Governor-General Dalhousie. Prior to the admin­
istration of Dalhousie, rail lines had been short and built 
for strategic reasons. It was he who gave the Government the 
idea of using private British enterprise to build an Indian 
rail system. Dalhousie1s suggestions were finally adopted
with the decision to build 5,000 miles of rail using joint-
33
stock companies from Britain. Bartle Prere reflected both
attitudes. While personal secretary to Governor George Arthur,
he pressed for a short rail line across Salsette. His greatest
interest lay, however, in the railroads used in conjunction
with the port of Karachi. He suggested, in 1853, the building
of the Karachi-to-Kotree rail line to connect the port with
the transfer point for steamers from the Punjab; finally
36
begun in 1858, it was completed in 1861. Prere, speaking 
at the inauguration of the railroad, alluded not only to such 
obvious advantages as the time that would be saved and its 
profitability to all concerned, but also to the fact that its 
very existence was sure to bind India to and solidify the
^Martineau, Prere, I, 103-04, 297-98.
350. H. B. E .. II, 789.
3 Martineau, Frere. I, 45, 95, 102-03
Empire. He touched upon an. even more significant develop­
ment in a later speech. The work on the railroads was 
helping to foster a new sense of independence in the average 
rail worker; in turn, the caste system was being transcended.
What would result, in Prere*s opinion, was worthy of more
37than passing thought.
British reform activity touched on other matters 
besides steamers and railroads. The Indian postage stamp, 
for example, owed a possible debt to Prere, if he himself is 
to be believed. The Sind postage stamp, which Prere intro­
duced in 1854, preceded the Indian one by two years. Use of 
the stamp had been encouraged by the refusal of the Indian 
Government to provide money for post offices, and Prere noted 
that 111 the system worked very well, and of course very 
cheaply, for we got a complete network of post-offices and
postal lines all over the country without expense*11; it also,
38he believed, provided the spark for the all-India stamp. 
India-wide, the increased use of.postage stamps had cut the 
postal deficit by two-thirds by 1858.^
Municipalities were also affected by British reform 
activity. When the British first came to India, they followed
^ 2 9  April 1858 (Karachi), 21 April 1863 (Khandalls), 
Pitale, Speeches. 220, 244-45#
^^Martineau, Prere. I, 111-12.
^ B *  S. P., "East India (Improvements in Administra­
tion)," XIIII, 1857-1858, 11.
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quickly on the heels of the Mughal official who collected 
taxes and provided a few basic services to traders in return. 
The British followed the tradition by consulting with the 
leading traders and other citizens about taxes. But of all 
the Presidencies, Bombay was the most active in India in 
implementing Act XXVI of 1850, which allowed municipalities 
to be set up.4^ Bartle Prere reflected Bombay*s interest in 
them. He had been President of the Karachi municipality from 
1852 to 1859. The importance of municipalities, in his view, 
was that improvement was a permanent, ongoing matter, instead 
of an ill-organized spurt of energy every now and then.4^
It was his opinion, that 11' large sums which ought to be raised 
and spent on objects more or less local (roads, canals, 
education, and many others), should have been provided by 
local taxation, locally arranged, by local bodies.1"4^ He 
had acquainted India with municipalities while he was in 
Sattara, so that money could be raised for his public works 
projects. Bombay was one of the more elaborate devices set 
up as a result of his efforts. It provided for a Municipal 
Commissioner and auxiliary officers in health, finance, and 
engineering. Financial supervision of these men was exercised 
by the bench of justices and the Governor-General. One of 
the fir3t actions taken by the Commissioner and his health
4QC. H. B. E .. V, 529-30.
4^Pitale, Speeches. 506.
4^Martineau, Prere. I, 303-04.
officer was a.move to cut the death rate in Bombay, ah effort
43which proved successful in later years.
In the end, public works became a double-edged swore.
It provided the foundation for Indian industry.44 Conversely
it often infringed upon Indian sensibilities, thereby laying
the groundwork for the Indian Mutiny. The Mutiny in turn
destroyed the old East India Company, compelling the British
Government to assume responsibility in 1858. (The Governor-
General also became known as Viceroy after this date.) As a
result of the Mutiny, decisions about Indian government were
increasingly made in London, the British grew suspicious of
reform, thus losing their former sense of mission, and racial
4.5antagonism arose.  ^ Frere, however, did not 'follow the trend 
the reasons for which were varied and are explained in the 
following chapter.
45Ibid, 71, 74, 462-63.
44Strachey, The End of Empire, 58.
4^Burt, Evolution. 427, 380-83, 386, 434-35.
CHAPTER III
INDIAN GOVERNMENT
Two reasons can be given for the opposition of Sir
Bartle Erere to the three basic trends— concentration of
power in London, loss of a sense of mission, and racial
antagonism— which followed the Indian Mutiny. The first
reason was his admiration for three former administrators
of the old East India Company, Mountstuart Elphinstone,
Sir Thomas Munro and Sir John Malcolm. Both Elphinstone
and Munro believed that Indian self-government was a certain
eventuality to be prepared for. Elphinstone envisioned that
it would come about principally through education of the
Indians. Malcolm was an advocate of Indian participation in
the covenanted civil service, to be gained through vernacular
education with the use of English as an auxiliary to convey
2
Western knowledge. One writer was essentially correct when 
he commented that in the first half of the nineteenth century 
the civil servants in India were pro-Indian.
Sir Henry Bartle Edward Prere, Indian Missions 
(London: John Murray, 1874), 12.
^Bearce, Attitudes. 245-47.
^Griffiths, Impact. 163-64.
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The second reason for the obstinacy of Frere must he
attributed to his administrative background. The Bind was a
Non-Regulation a r e a t h a t  is, one of those areas annexed
(5
since the late eighteenth century. It has been described
by one writer as being
characterised by simple and more direct methods of 
procedure and by the greater accessibility of the 
officials to the people; but chiefly by the union of 
all powers— executive, magisterial and judicial— in 
the hands of the District Officer, here termed Deputy 
Commissioner, subject, however to the appellate and 
supervisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the 
Division in all branches of work. The system was 
paternal rather than formally legal though legal 
principles were by no means set aside and it largely 
depended for its success on the personal character, r
initiative, vigour and discretion of the local officers.
The system was not arbitrary, for certain principles were
set down on which the District Officer based his conduct,
and there was always supervision by the Commissioner. It
was essentially a return to the practice of the Mughal Empire
of letting executive decisions be made by the man on the spot
7
in this case the District Officer described above.
With such a background, it is easy to understand the 
reaction of Bartle Frere to the manner in which Bengal was 
governed. He blamed the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58 on the fact
^Edward Thompson and G. T. Garratt, Rise and Fulfil­
ment of British Rule in India (Allr.habad: Central Book Depot
1962), 47&-77* Hereinafter referred to as Thompson and 
Garratt, Rule.
5C. H. B. E .. V, 22.
6Ibid. 87.
Griffiths, Impact. 164-65.
22
that the Bengal Army was controlled by paper departments and 
underpaid officers who had no real authority. It seemed to 
Frere that it had no commander. The need, therefore, was for 
its centralization through well-paid officers who knew their 
men by inspection. Fewer officers, fewer European troops 
and mercenaries would be needed. Diversity of units, dictated 
by conditions, could be tolerated. This idea was based on 
Frere*s premise that it was very important to an Asiatic 
soldier to know who was his master, for he had known only 
despotic government. Officers, therefore, should be given 
complete authority over the natives, including the right to 
dismiss. The officer would be given blame along with praise 
in retrospect, and he would not have to obtain previous 
sanction for anything; otherwise the native soldiers would 
start to doubt the officer’s authority, and undermine disci­
pline .8
The premise Bartle Frere used to rationalize his 
approach to the Bengal Army also.underlay his approach to 
the Bengal Government. The problem was that there was no 
benign despot, for a benign despotic government was the only 
one the natives would respect. Calcutta officials were not 
accessible to those natives in the outlying provinces who 
needed help. The answer to Bengal*s problem was a structured 
authority, where responsible officials ruled in matters that
O
Frere to Lord Goderich (15 June 1858); Sir George 
Clerk (16 January 1859), Martineau, Frere. I, 265-66, 271-72.
fell below them, but were still responsible to superiors
Q
above.^
Another proposition which Frere looked at with the 
jaundiced eye of a Sind administrator was that of centraliz­
ation. This was the movement of administration after the 
Mutiny to take on a more unified, technical, and department­
alized appearance.^ In a dispatch of 15 January 1858 to 
Bombay, Frere noted that the only way centralization could 
work was by entrusting the government official on the spot 
with the responsibility for decisions. It was in this way 
that the British Indian Empire had been made great; centralize 
by departments in a far-away place and it "becomes deranged 
by the slightest trial or s h o c k . C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  violated 
the area formerly covered by the District Officer and the 
provincial governments. The technical departments that grew 
up were especially mischievous, for it was "difficult for the 
District Officer to ease those hardships which must occur
when illiterate villagers are first brought into contact with
12Western legal and commercial ideas.” Frere outlined the 
concrete result some sixteen years later, in 1874. Authority 
diffused into too many British administrative hands produced
^Frere to Lord Coderich (15 June 1858), Ibid. 266-67.
^Thompson and Carratt, Rule. 477-79.
*^Frere to Bombay (15 January 1858), Martineau,
Frere. I, 101.
^Thompson and Carratt, Rule. 478-79.
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the "Village Hampden," who played one administrator off
against the other. There was the ultimate collapse of an
already ancient and fossilized village structure." Another
problem department was that of public works. It was set up
after the Mutiny, and caused endless trouble until Lord Mayo
remedied it in 1870. There was a constant squabble between
the Government of India and provincial governments over the
allocation of money and control of the work to be done.*^
While Governor of Bombay, Frere once reminded Colonel R.
Strachey that he could not be both Secretary of the public
works department and also superintend all its work. Such a
course would paralyze the whole scheme. The Governor proposed,
instead, a minimum amount of paper work and a maximum amount
15of construction.
After the Indian Mutiny, Britain gave up thoughts of 
unifying the whole of India under its direct control. The 
British felt that their former policy had impeded progress in 
the independent states by creating uncertainty as to their 
future. The new attitude towards the independent Indian 
states still in existence was outlined in the Proclamation 
of 1858. It assured their ruling heads of state of the right 
to perpetual rule and succession. While doing this, however,
13Frere, Indian Missions. 59-61.
^Thompson and Garratt, Rule. 479.
^Frere to Strachey (12 October 1865)# Martineau,
Frere. I, 423.
the British still exercised an indirect influence by reminding
rulers of their responsibility for the welfare of their people,
16and warned against the needless expense of standing armies.
Sir Bartle Frere brought this out at several of his durbars 
while he was Governor of Bombay. He warned the assembled 
Indian nobility, at Poona in 1865 and 1866, of the consequences 
of failure. Those who had led India in the past had to take 
a larger share in administering their country in the future, 
or they would be left both powerless and without honor.
British dominion over the Indian princes had enhanced immensely 
their ability for doing good by limiting their power to do 
wrong. Most important, perhaps, was the exhortation by Frere 
at Belgaum in 1865. He invited the rulers of the Indian 
states to forget about enemies now far away since the arrival, 
of the British. Instead of employing one more policeman than 
was necessary for internal peace, the money should be spent 
on roads, irrigation, bridges, and hospitals, among other 
projects.^
The ideas of Bartle Frere concerning centralization 
came into play when he joined Lord Canning, Governor-General 
and Viceroy of India, in Calcutta in 1859# One example was 
his attitude towards a proposal to reform Canning’s council.
One must retrace the manner in which the government of India
16Thompson and Garratt, Rule. 479.
^ 4  September 1865, 29 November 1866 (Poona);
28 November 1865 (Belgaum) Durbars. Pitale, Speeches. 4-5.
14-15, 8-9*
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was set up after the Mutiny in order to understand the 
significance of the proposal. The British Government of 
Lord Derby had shaped the Indian Government Act of 1858 and 
guided it through Parliament after the Mutiny had been put 
down that same year. The Act provided for the transfer of 
power from the East India Company to the British Government.
The intention of the Government was that British India govern 
itself with as little interference from Britain as possible. 
There was a Council of India to assist the Secretary of State. 
The Council was composed of fifteen members holding life 
membership unless a petition was put forward by both houses 
of Parliament. Uine of the fifteen members were to have served 
in India for at least ten years, seven of the fifteen were 
nominated by the East India Company voting in council, and 
eight were appointed by the Crown. The Secretary of State 
had to give reasons for ignoring a majority vote of the 
Council concerning most Indian measures; matters concerning 
either expenditure or loans had to have the Council*s approval. 
It was hoped that neither Secretary nor Council would dominate 
the other.'1'8
Sir Bartle Prere believed that the arrangement 
described above was threatened by the proposal of Lord Canning 
to alter his council. Canning*s aim was to gain real control 
over that body. He wanted, first of all, to abolish the veto
180. H. B. E.. V, 206-12.
power of the executive council over the Governor-General1s
plans. Canning also wanted to alter their habit of doing
work on a collective basis. He proposed, instead, that he
be given the right to appoint secretaries to advise him on
departmental matters; group meetings would be held only if
he and a departmental secretary disagreed on a matter. Lord
Stanley, Secretary of State for India, was in agreement with
Canning's recommendation, and an India Council committee
recommended that it be expanded to include the governors'
councils throughout India. When Sir Charles Wood became
Secretary of State for India in June 1859» he had another
India Council committee study the recommendations made by
Canning. r It recommended that secretaries be nominated by the
Governor-General, with the Secretary of State for India
having veto power. The two recommendations by the committees
were transmitted to India. The subsequent letter from Sir
Bartle Frere to Sir Charles Wood was the most violently
19critical opinion of these recommendations. ^
Frerefs letter to Wood argued that the veto power of 
the Secretary of State would make him responsible for affairs 
previously under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General. 
Such responsibility would necessitate more knowledge of the 
Indian situation. The knowledge could come only from the
20Council of India in England, but it was often out of date.
He recommended another course, if India was to be ruled from
19rbid, 226-28. 20Ibid. 228.
London. The Secretary should turn over responsibility for
the affairs of India to a select number of Council of India
members, and dispense with the remainder. This would allow
the Secretary time to deal with major problems and answer^
questions in Parliament, while the Council under-secretaries
did the actual work. Frere had written that nyou can have
but one real Government for India, and that . . . Government
can only safely be in India.” Frere was perhaps exaggerating
in his letter of 15 May 1860 to Wood, but it provided some
basis for his own vision of an ideal government for India.
His plan kept the Secretary of State of the role described
above, but substituted the Governor-General for the Council
of India members. The Secretary of State would formulate
the system of government for India. The Governor-General
would make the actual decisions, with the Secretary of State
21defending them in Cabinet and Parliament.
Two views shaped Frere*s outlook on the governing 
of India. First, the Governor-General should be praised or 
blamed for his actions, but only removed, if necessary, after 
he had acted. Second, Frerefs distrust of the Council of 
India was total. He once wrote to Wood that it had the 
potential of carrying Britain back to the days when the 
Colonial Office tried to dictate to the colonies across the 
seas, and had "very nearly lost them in the attempt." The
^Frere to Sir Charles Wood (15 May 1860); Frere to 
Sir George Clerk (9 May 1860); Minute 2 October 1861, 
Martineau, Frere. I, 351, 309, 347.
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comparison between the two——Governor—General and Council of
India— presented an inescapable conclusion. It was difficult
for members on the Council of India to be up-to-date, since
events moved so fast in India. The Governor-General, in
contrast, was admirably situated to know what was going on
22and advise the Secretary of State wisely. Canning never 
carried out his proposals for secretarial reform. The logic 
in Frere1s letter led Canning to abandon the idea in favor of 
department portfolios for councillors. This was embodied in 
the Council Act of 1861 which Wood had introduced in Parlia­
ment. The Governor—General had, under this Act, five 
councillors with different duties to advise him. These men
were, in turn, helped by bodies of secretaries and under-
23secretaries.
James Wilson's income tax was another problem which 
Frere commented on while in Calcutta. The matter of income 
tax had arisen because the Indian debt, including the East 
India Company's account, was 198 million in 1860. The 
operating deficit for the year 1859—60 alone stood at & 7 i  
million. The British Government was rather apprehensive 
about running more deficits. They sent a financial expert, 
James Wilson, from England to work on the problem. Wilson 
eliminated the deficit from the Indian budget by ruthlessly
op
Frere to lord de Grey (9 June 1861); Frere to Sir 
Charles Wood (22 October I860), Ibid, 357, 359.
23C. H. B. E.. V, 228-29.
slashing civil and military expenditure on one hand and 
adding to government revenue through the use of an income 
tax on the o t h e r F r e r e  supported the imposition of the 
income tax for two reasons. First, Wilson’s plans for direct 
taxes were not revolutionary in Indian finance, since sub­
stantially similar taxes had existed until 1834 in Bengal 
and 1836 in Bombay. They were abolished only because making 
them uniform would have been an impossible task. Second,
Frere favored direct rather than indirect taxation. The 
abolition of indirect taxes in the newly-annexed native 
states had been popular with everyone except capitalists;
25indirect taxes also hindered legitimate trade and commerce. 
Frere’s opinions on taxation were futuristic. The income tax
26was lifted in 1865, but reimposed as a permanent tax in 1886.
Sir Bartle Frere also looked to the future of British 
India in the matter of representation on the governors* 
councils. He had noted in a letter of 10 April 1861 to Sir 
Charles Wood that the day had come when ** ’Europeans and the 
Europeanized community” 1 should be included on the legis­
lative councils. Anything less, he feared, might lead to
27**funlooked-for and dangerous explosions.” 1 Both Canning
24Ibia. 314-15.
Frere to Sir Charles Wood (23 April 1860); Minute 
17 February 1860, Martineau, Frere. I, 306-07, 303-04.
26C. H. B. E .. V, 317.
2^Frere to Sir Charles Wood (10 April 1861), Martineau, 
Frere. I, 340.
and Wood agreed in large part with Frere on the deficiencies
of the councils. Wood, as a result, introduced a hill into
Parliament which subsequently became the legislative Councils
Act of 1861. It provided for the expansion of the Governor-
General's council from six to twelve persons. Six councillors
were to be non-governmental personnel, with the implication
that some would be Indian. The expanded council would consider
legislation, but the Governor-General had veto power over what 
28was passed. The first three Indian members of the council 
were aristocrats, however, and it was several years before 
the British could use the body as a conduit to involve
29business and professional men in the governing of India.
The British immigrants flooding India after the 
Mutiny showed a disriminatory attitude towards the Indians 
that Frere abhorred. He protested, for instance, against 
exemptions included for non-Indians in an 1860 bill forbidding 
possession of arms. In Frerefs view, the bill was suggestive 
of a slave state. There was, too, the possibility of revolt 
in the Northwest if the British tried to take arms away from 
the people there. A better way to control arms, if necessary, 
was through licensing or district searches of houses by 
authority of the Indian Government. He believed that the 
Government did not need to trample on Indian rights in order
28C. H. B. E .. V, 234-36, 234 n.l.
29Thompson and Garratt, Rule. 476.
30rbid, 475.
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to ensure European immigration. The goal could be attained
31by good administration of all inhabitants under the same laws.
The attitude of Sir Bartle Frere on the role of
missions largely paralleled his conclusion on gun control.
The question of missions was an old bone of contention. It
had originated in an argument between the East India Company,
which feared a rebellion among the Indians if religion was
pushed too hard, and those who favored an evangelical program
in India. The apparent winner was the latter party, and the
charter renewals of 1813 and 1833 provided for sees in
Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, to be supported by territorial
revenue of the Company. The East India Company was more
successful, however, in erecting a barrier between its
schools and colleges and Christian missionary activity.
Bibles were allowed in libraries of educational institutions,
but teachers were only allowed to answer spontaneous questions
about religion after school hours. By themselves, church
schools were allowed to qualify for grants-in-aid under an 
321854 plan. Frere held the church schools in high esteem.
They taught, in his opinion, a much wider range of subjects
than Government schools, and instruction was better. Their
graduates were better disciplined and were willing to work
33hard and quietly.
^Speech; Frere to Barrow (6 August 1860), Martineau, 
Frere. I, 328-29.
32C. H. B. E .. V, 121-24.
333 July 1862 (Poona), Pitale, Speeches. 172-73.
Frere lavished praise upon the mission schools, yet
he was adamant in barring religious activity of any kind
from Government schools. Two dispatches from Sir Charles
Wood, dated 17 June and 1 September 1864, to Frere in Bombay
outlined a complaint by the Church Missionary Society about
the lack of religious teaching in Bombay schools. The second
dispatch suggested after-hours religious classes taught by
34schoolmasters as a solution.^ The reply Frere sent was in
the best tradition of the old East India Company and
Mountstuart Elphinstone, both firm opposers of mixing educ-
35ation and religion for fear of exciting the Indians. Frere 
stated that the missionaries on the spot were doing a better 
job at conversion than many of their friends believed. Their 
success resulted, in large part, from the absence of bitter­
ness among Indians because of the nfreally fair and impartial 
course pursued by this Government on all questions of religion 
and education.f” Teaching of religion in schools, besides 
endangering missionary work in general, would end in the
same bankruptcy for the church in India as had resulted from
36that policy in Ireland. In all fairness to the missionaries, 
^^Martineau, Frere. I, 470.
^Minute, March 1824, George W. Forrest, ed.,
Selections from the Minutes and Other Official Writings of 
the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone. Governor" of Bombay 
(London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1884), 81.
^Frere to Sir Charles Wood (22 July 1864, 27 September 
1864), Martineau, Frere, I, 471, 470.
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however, even Frere later admitted that the spread of religion
37in the country had heen only minimal.
The episode of the dispatch of Sir Charles Wood
legitimately leads to the question of exactly what Sir Bartle
Frere thought of missions, their function, and relation to
government. He outlined much of his thinking on this subject
in a dispatch to lord Stanley in 1858. He noted his active,
albeit private, support of Christian missions in India, and
indicated his belief that they had helped to bring a big
change for the better. As mentioned above, however, he did
not want to see their accomplishments wiped out by ill-
advised abandonment of the English tradition of religious
toleration. The Government of India should not use its
power to force Christianity on the Indians; such a course
smacked of Inquisition.^8 It should, instead, ensure the
toleration of individual opinion and speech. That role could
39not be performed by the spreading of religious instruction.
The function of independent missionaries, on the other hand, 
was to perform a task that no government could possibly 
attempt without danger; that is, they could teach what the 
West valued most. The missionaries needed to work first 
among the European community, starting with the soldiers and
J Sir Bartle Frere, "Speech to Working Men’s Meeting,” 
Authorized Report of the Church Congress (Bath, 1873), 217.
^8Frere to Lord Stanley (19 December 1858), Martineau, 
Frere. I, 259-60.
39Frere, Indian Missions. 77.
sailors, then the clerks, cooks, and others.^ The mission­
aries, by doing such work, would have the European community 
as an example before going to the Indians themselves. It 
was an important aim, since every Englishman was a "public 
character" because of his potential influence over the 
Indians.^1
One of the more touchy aspects of British admin­
istration in India was the covenanted^-2 civil service. This 
group held the responsible positions in the Indian Govern­
ment, including judicial posts under the East India Company 
and the British Government. It was largely British, and 
training for it took place at an English university after 
acceptance by examination. Its counterpart was the uncoven­
anted civil service, composed mostly of Indians who held 
lower posts in government. The Charter Act of 1833 and the 
Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 had confirmed the right of 
native-born Indians to enter the covenanted civil service.
Pew Indians took the opportunity, however, because it was a 
certain road to social ostracism. The years from 1858 until 
1886 produced no real change in the staffing of the Indian
A C\
Undated note on prepared Pree Kirk General Assembly 
speech; Prere to Lord Goderich (5 January 1859), Martineau, 
Prere, I, 471-72, 262.
^ 2 9  August 1863 (Poona), Pitale, Speeches. 251-52.
^2The word "covenanted" was used because agreements 
of employment were signed with-the East India Company; the 
practice continued after Britain assumed the duties of the 
Company in India. C a H. B. E .. V, 357. Prere was a member 
of this group.
civil service. It amply upheld the tradition, as described 
in the House of Commons in 1853, of being a "’native agency 
and European superintendence.”1 While Lord Lawrence was 
Yiceroy, however, the scarcity of Indian candidates for 
competitive examinations to enter the covenanted civil service 
caused some concern. It was therefore proposed in 1868 that 
scholarships be provided, partially on the basis of nomination 
and partially be competition, to send Indians to England for 
education. The idea was that once the Indian’s education 
was completed, he would enter the civil service or some other
A *2
professional position.
The proposal of the Indian Government for scholar­
ships did not suit the Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll, 
and he turned down the suggestion.^ This action brought a 
quick retort from Bartle Prere. A "Dissent by Sir Bartle 
Prere," dated 18 Pebruary 1868, referred to the very limited 
opportunities for Indian employment in positions of high 
responsibility in the Indian Government. He lashed out at 
the "rather pompous parade • • •.of a few crumbs of patron­
age." The way to get Indians into responsible government 
jobs, such as positions on the bench, was to pay them enough 
that lawyers could leave the bar. The objective was to 
Anglicize public servants so that they would identify them-
43rbld, 357, 359-62.
44Ibid. 360.
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selves with the Indian Government in the belief that it was
15the best possible one.
Entrance into the higher civil service ultimately 
depended on adequate Indian education, as Mountstuart 
Elphinstone had foreseen. Elphinstone had a two-tier educa­
tion program. He favored Western learning for those Indians
considering high public office. He also backed improved and
4.6expanded vernacular schools. Generally, however, Elphinstone 
saw Indian education as being primarily concerned with the 
upper castes; otherwise there would be a danger of revolt by 
a dissatisfied educated lower caste. The other objective for 
which Elphinstone strived was education of Indians built on 
their own tradition. ^  Bartle Prere, like Elphinstone, 
deprecated any effort to educate the Indians on a massive 
scale because of lack of plans or money. He favored a return 
to the old Directive of 1854 with its grants-in-aid for educa­
tion, the planning being done according to the needs of each 
province. A few general rules and guidelines as to how the 
money was to be spent were all that was needed.
^ B. S. P .. ”East India (Employment of Natives),” L, 
1867-1868, 293-94.
46C. H. B. E .. V, 107-08.
17^'Bruce T. McCully, English Education and the Origin 
of Indian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1940;, 29.
^Frere to lord Goderich (5 January 1859), Martineau, 
Prere, I, 261.
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Like Elphinstone, Sir Bartle Prere favored the upper
classes in his framework of education. Others who would
possibly benefit from education were the Bheels, coolies and
some other races; some were not badly in need of it but could
4.9use it to their own advantage. Prere stressed the Charter 
clause of 1833, ending discrimination against Indians in
50higher employment, and its importance to the upper classes. 
Only by supplying men of similar caliber to those of English 
universities, he warned, could Indians hope to take positions 
in public administration. This requirement was doubly impor­
tant, however, for the Sirdar youth; without education, 
"wealth and power" would be taken from their hands in the 
future.51
Regarding the university graduate, Prere envisioned 
a special need for him to communicate, in vernacular litera­
ture, the European learning he had acquired. Even more 
important was his role as teacher of the people, the "most 
powerful of levers to move the great mass of popular ignor­
ance." He formed the link between men of different race and 
religion, keeping them together when they might otherwise 
fall apart. He promoted an understanding and appreciation
49Tbid, 262.
50C. E. Carrington, The British Overseas; Exploits 
of a Nation of Shopkeepers, ftart" Is Making of the Empire 
(2nd ed.; Cambridge, England: University Press, 1968), 431*
•^6 April 1863 (Bombay); 28 November 1865 (Belgaum) 
Durbar, Pitale, Speeches, 120-22, 9-10.
of the purpose of British rule, which was pledged to administer 
for the good of the Indian people, Indian classical litera­
ture, such as Zend and Sanskrit, would fulfill the same
52function as the Western classical languages. The educated 
Indian was, in short, a most important link in British rule 
of India,
Frere was generally true to what he conceived to he
the hallmark of good government, which one author has termed
55ffpervading influence,11 The emphasis was on individual 
initiative on the part of the administrator; Indians were not 
to be forced upon, but taught the fruits of Western progress 
by example. Education was to be the link between the British 
and Indians to achieve this goal.
^228 April 1862, 8 April 3 865, 11 April 1864,
8 January 1867, 6 April 1863 (Bombay), Pitale, Speeches. 110, 
141, 133, 155, 120.
^Archibald Paton Thornton, The Imperial Idea and 
Its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London: Macmillan;
New York: St. Martin1 s Press, 196f>), 79# Hereinafter
referred to as Thornton, Idea.
CHAPTER IV 
DEFENSE OF INDIA
An understanding of the views of Sir Bartle Frere on 
the defense of India, basically a problem of the frontier 
tribes and Afghanistan, is essential for two reasons. First, 
it serves as a good barometer of the imperialist impulse in 
British foreign policy. The new imperialist outlook took 
root in the dispute over the defense of India, because it 
was the most pressing concern of the Empire at that time. 
Second, Frere*s views on Indian defense provide a basis for 
his later actions in South Africa.
The matter of the frontier tribes arose when the 
British occupied the Sind in 1843 and the Punjab in 1849.
They found themselves confronting the Baluches and Pathans, 
tribes which regularly raided the Sind and Punjab; this in 
turn meant they had to deal with the local overlords, the 
Khan of Kalat and the Amir of Afghanistan. Two schools of 
thought, the Sind and Punjab schools, developed as to how 
frontier defense should be conducted in view of the problems 
with the tribes. The schools differed in two important 
aspects. First, the Sind theory of administration emphasized 
repression; in contrast, the Punjab school depended more on 
political control of the frontier tribes. Second, the Sind
40
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system was rather unorthodox in depending, after 1848, on
Major Jacob and his completely mobile t r o o p s T h e  essential
character of Jacob's system was described by Bartle Frere.
It meant, he wrote, that authority— civil and military,
regular and native troops, engineers, police— was concentrated,
2
and not fragmented as in the Punjab* He was impressed with 
the results of the system* Jacob had introduced order where 
there had been none before* There was no fear of raiders and 
people were able to travel in perfect safety along the fron­
tier* Jacobabad, under Jacob's direction, had been turned
from an area of desert into a garden of plenty, with crops
*5and canals crisscrossing the area* Two points should be 
noted from the above description: the stress laid by Prere
on the unitary nature of Jacob's system, and the resulting 
advances in civilized behavior. The effect on Prere cannot 
be emphasized enough. The success of the system was a major 
determinant in his thoughts on frontier defense, whether 
Indian or South African, for the rest of his life.
Prere continually emphasized the authoritarianism 
and civilized nature of the Sind system. Pirst, it was 
basically a military system depending to a large extent on 
the cooperation of the frontier tribes and the Khan of Kalat
1C. H. B. E .. V, 448-50.
p
Prere for Lord Northbrook (1876 Memorandum),
Martineau, Prere, I, 165#
^Prere to Lord Falkland (March 1855), Ibid. 148-49.
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in securing the border. Second, and more important, it was
a civilized system. At its center was the Khan of Kalat.
Uninfluenced inside his own territory, he was tinder British
military direction concerning external relations. The Khan
was treated as an independent ally. A cardinal rule was to
bolster him in every way possibles complaints below the
level of chief, for instance, were referred to the chiefs;
complaints by or against the chiefs were referred to the
Khan. The Khan was encouraged to keep an orderly government
and satisfy any of these complaints.^ Tribesmen along the
Sind frontier were safe from British retaliation if their
activities did not threaten the people on the British side
of the border, or the Khan of Kalat. The use of troops was
generally restricted to those cases which police were unable
to handle. Armed theft of cattle, for example, was included
in this category. Forays across the Sind frontier in search
of marauders were purely a military matter. Troops considered
15
everyone armed^ on the British side of the border as their 
enemy; on the other side, an enemy of the Khan of Kalat.
^Extracts Illustrative of the Sind Frontier System,11 in 
Sir Bartle Frere, Afghanistan and South Africa: Letters to
the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. Regarding Portions of 
iHis MidlothianSpeeches, and a Letter to the hate Sir John 
Kaye, and Other Papers (5th ed.j London; John Murray, 1881),
Y6, 73. Hereinafter referred to as Frere, Afghanistan.
Sir Bartle did not doubt where the real loyalties of 
the chiefs lay, and he wrote about how they would revert to 
their own authority if British power or resolve ever weakened. 
Frere to Major Green (16 October 1858), Martineau, Frere. I, 
244-45.
3 0 .  H. B. E .. V, 449.
Attention was directed only at those who resisted and whole­
sale destruction was not permitted. Prisoners taken by troops
6on the Khan's side of the border were turned over to him.
Prere, in a letter to lord Elphinstone, described a strike
on a frontier tribe (the Murrees) by Major H. G-reen, British
Resident to the Khan of Kalat. He noted that it had been
done without "'massacre, plunder, or destruction, or barbarity,
7
or severity.'"
Prere took a dim view, on the other hand, of the 
Punjab frontier system. The Sind system made every effort 
to bolster the authority of the Khan of Kalat. Punjab author­
ities, in contrast, bypassed the Amir of Afghanistan, overlord 
of the frontier tribes in that area. They tried, instead, 
to deal separately with each tribe, and to use them as a 
buffer between the Amir and the Punjab. Prere also criticized 
the retaliatory raids made along the Punjab border for 
marauders. Authorities failed to note, in doing so, that the 
tribes were usually divided into two classes: those who
plundered and those who cultivated. Punjab authorities, by 
destroying the crops and goods of the latter, united the whole 
tribe against them. Writing of the retaliatory raids of 1860 
along the Punjab border against the Wuzzeerees, Prere indica­
ted that a much more telling blow could have been dealt if a
• "Extracts Illustrative of the Sind Frontier System,1 
in Prere. Afghanistan. 73-74.
7
Prere to Lord Elphinstone, Martmeau, Prere. I,
248-50.
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list of the men to he surrendered had been handed to the 
chiefs. A large share of subsequent property and crop destruc­
tion, as a result, would have fallen on the menfs heads, 
encouraging them to think more seriously before going on plun­
dering forays again.®
Paralleling the problem of the frontier tribes was the 
question of Afghanistan. The problem dated from the 1830s, 
but the years from 1850 until the early part of the twentieth 
century saw it become even more complicated with the advent 
of the telegraph and cable. European governments were able 
both to control and be influenced by events in that sphere 
through these devices. Afghanistan and all of Central Asia
q
then became the main preoccupation of Indian external policy. 
Afghanistan played an especially important part in this drama 
because the British were advancing on it from the south, and 
the Russians from the north. Indian administrators were 
generally of either of two opinions about the conduct of 
relations between Great Britain,.the tribes of the Northwest 
Frontier, and Afghanistan. First, a succession of Viceroys 
from Canning on regarded interference as too dangerous, 
especially after the events of 1838-42 described below.
Second, the "forward" school felt that the course of events
®Minute 22 May 1860; Frere for Lord Northbrook (1876 
Memorandum); Frere to Lord Canning (15 November i860), Ibid, 
362—64, 165—66, 366—68.
9C. H. B. B.. V, 403.
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t
made interference inevitable. Such interference would take 
the form of 11 alliances, missions, and, where necessary, 
subsidies in the form of money and material of war.”10 John 
Lawrence was representative of the first view and, as we shall 
see, Bartle Frere of the latter.
No adequate comprehension of the problem of Afghan­
istan can be gained without tracing the history of active 
British involvement which began there in 1838. The Afghan 
ruler Taimur had died in 1793# A struggle ensued for the 
throne, and was settled in 1826 with the accession of Dost 
Muhammed. Twenty-three royal claimants, including the major 
one, Shah Shuja, had been excluded by his accession. Shah 
ShuJa had royal descent on his side; Dost Muhammed strength 
and ability. At this point Afghan politics became entangled 
with what was happening in Persia, where Russia's influence 
increased steadily after 1828. The British began to worry 
about the situation. A Persian attack on Herat menaced 
Eastern Afghanistan. Dost Muhammed was also threatening the 
holdings of Ranjit Singh centered in Peshawar because of his 
cooperation with Shah Shuja for the recovery of the Afghan 
throne. Finally, there was the collaboration of Dost Muhammed 
with the Russians, already dominant in Persia. All these 
factors resulted in a "'Tripartite Treaty'” between Shah Shuja,
10A. W. Ward and G-. P. Gooch, eds., The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy, III (New York: Macmillan
Company; Cambridge, England: University Press, 1923), 72-73•
Hereinafter referred to as C. H. B. F. P.
4 b
Ranjit Singh, and the British. The essential element in the 
treaty was the British promise to help Shah Shuja recover the 
Afghan throne. It was hoped that in this way Britain would 
secure a friendly Afghanistan. The result was an unmitigated 
disaster. Active British involvement lasted from November 
1838 to December 1842. During that time, the British military 
force which had placed Shah Shuja on the Afghan throne found 
itself isolated in Kabul by angry Afghans. Trying to flee, 
they were cut down almost to a man. Once Kabul had been 
retaken, the British were forced to reinstate Dost Muhammed 
on the throne in order to extricate themselves from an imposs­
ible situation."^
Stung by the events of 1838-1842, Indian policy for
another thirty years was one of non-interference in Afghan 
12affairs. All this was quite distasteful to Sir Bartle Frere
who, along with Sir Henry Rawlinson, was worried about the
13Russian threat to India. The Disraeli Ministry, which 
replaced that of Gladstone in 1874> gave Frere his opening.
One of the aims of the new Government was to initiate a more 
active foreign policy, especially in Central Asia, where it 
wanted to eradicate the dominant position held by Russia.
Lord Salisbury was made Secretary of State for India. A dis-
l:LC. H. B. E .. V, 484-96, 499-521 .
12C. H. B. f. P .. Ill, 72.
R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli. Gladstone and the 
Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics
(Londons Macmillan and Co., 1935), 220.
47
patch of 22 January 1875 from Salisbury to the Indian Viceroy 
marked the genesis of the new British Afghan policy. It 
instructed the Viceroy to put into effect a program based on 
Sir Henry Rawlinson's minute of 1868. This minute had pro­
posed that a resident b e .stationed in Afghanistan; going 
first to Herat, then Kabul, he was to supplement the regular 
native agent. The dispatch had been sent upon the instigation 
of Frere, then a member of the India Council.^ These actions 
underlined a point later made by Frere (in 1880) from which 
he never deviated: British isolation from Afghan affairs
was self-defeating, for it only drove Afghanistan into the
15arms of another power.
In an article written in 1875 as a public exposition 
of the actions taken by Salisbury, Sir Bartle Frere gave the 
most comprehensive outline of his views on the Afghan problem 
(past and present) and Central Asia in general. Looking back 
on previous British policy, he ridiculed British actions 
against Dost Muhammed, the one man who could have assured 
Britain of a strong and independent, but friendly Afghan
state. Backing him would have been in Britain’s real interest,
16and not maneuvers to remove him. British officials acted 
more like "Chinese mandarins” than anything else from that
14~C. H. B. g. P .. Ill, 77-78.
15^ ’’Memorandum enclosed in Cape of Good Hope Despatch, 
No. 9,” in Frere, Afghanistan. 11.
16C. H. B. B.. IV, 493.
time on by their complete disregard of what was happening 
across the Indian border. The IMpolicy of masterly inactiv­
ity,*” Frere declared, had been nothing more than denying the 
existence of a Russian menace in Central Asia. But now, in 
the 1870s, even the supporters pf the policy were abandoning 
the ship. Public writers were demanding that the British 
Government do something about the Russian threat. Moves
mentioned included sending an army to the Northwest Frontier
17and a fleet to the Baltic.
Frere was not as easily intimidated by the Russians 
as were others, for he saw Russian weaknesses in any power 
play involving India, Afghanistan, and Britain. Russia by 
itself had neither the money, men, nor necessary organization 
to go to war with Britain. The British navy could harass 
the Russians at will from the Baltic Sea to the Indus, and 
Britain possessed men capable of defeating any invading force 
by cutting its lines of communication. The problem facing 
the Russians, therefore, was that a direct attack on India 
required an aggregate of powers to overcome the first-rate 
navy possessed by Britain. Russia would be risking a general 
war in Europe, destroying the work of ages in the process, and 
leaving it, in the end, a second-rate European power. Russia 
also had to consider the potentially explosive situation at 
home. Revolutionary changes were taking place in the country’s
*^Sir H. B. E. Frere, ’’England and Russia-in the 
East,” The Quarterly Review. CXXXVII (April 1875), 571-74# 
Hereinafter referred to as Frere, "East.”
social fabric. Any attempt at conquest would drain away
energy needed for problems arising between peasant, aristoc-
18racy, and educated classes.
Russia, even so, had to be viewed as an aggressive 
power in its own right. Just as Britain had built its own 
Indian Empire, Russia was benefiting from the introduction 
of a more effective government in the decayed states it over­
ran. People were glad to rid themselves of oppressors. 
Russian aggression was perhaps even more real than previous 
British expansion because of strong public support in Russia; 
on the other hand, the British had been compelled to contend 
with the majority of the home population opposed to expansion 
in India. Such public support in Russia was largely explain­
able because expansion was linked to religion, a strong 
political force "inseparably” bound up with the throne.
Then, too, the throne’s decision to stamp out slavery among 
the Central Asian Turkomans gave the whole enterprise the 
aura of a holy crusade. Frere asserted that such strong sup­
port for Russian aggression required that it be stopped by an 
equally civilized power. It had to "give her honest hearing
and reasonable redress in all frontier discussions, and . . .
19require equal justice from her."
Although the chances of outright aggression by Russia 
on India were so slight, Frere feared subterfuge. He had
18rbld, 591, 593.
19Ibid. 581, 583-86, 588.
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outlined what could happen in his letter to Sir John Kaye in
1874. First, large-scale Russian influence on the Afghans
could undermine Indian confidence in British rule. Second,
in the case of British preoccupation with problems elsewhere,
the threat of a Russo-Afghan invasion could tie down vast
numbers of British troops in India. Third, and most probable,
Russian and Afghan irregulars had the capacity to start fron-
20tier trouble costing the British a great deal to contain.
Of these three, the first possibility was the most unlikely.
John Lawrence had pointed out in his Memorandum later in the
year that most natives did not follow Russian progress in
Central Asia. Those Indians who were interested had probably
not given careful consideration to the problem or what an
21occupation of Afghanistan would entail.
The logical question at this point was what should be 
done to prevent undue Russian influence in Afghanistan.
Three points conveyed in the article by Frere on "Russia and 
England in the East” should be borne in mind in evaluating 
his ideas concerning this problem. First, Frere believed 
that the Russians had a naturally active policy. Past British 
policy had been not only defensive but also negative. No 
friends were to be won in this way among the Orientals; 
instead, the Russians advanced that much closer. A true
20Frere to Sir John Kaye (12 June 1874), in Frere, 
Afghanistan. 56-38.
21"Memorandum by the Right Hon. Lord Lawrence on the 
Central Asian Question," Ibid. 48.
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defensive policy, in contrast, required carefully-considered
action on several fronts. Second, Frere’s biggest concern
was to construct a policy putting British relations with its
nneighbours north and west of India on a more permanently
satisfactory footing.11 Third, he did not contemplate Britain
trying to halt the Russian advance until it reached the
22Afghan border. The last point was part of his concept, 
mentioned in a note to Lawrence’s Central Asian Memorandum 
(1875)9 of considering all areas which adjoined India as 
bulwarks to its security. They were not to be open to any 
type of political influence impairing the security of India.
t
Besides Afghanistan, Nepal, Tibet, Baluchistan, and Kashmir
fell into such a category. The British and Russians, in
25other words, would not meet on the Indian border.
No natural buffer was obtainable, however, in 
Afghanistan. Britain had missed its one chance to have such 
a buffer while Dost Muhammed was alive. Now, as Frere out­
lined in his letter of 1874 to Sir John Kaye, it had to be 
done with definite intent on Britain’s part, and possibly by 
force. One of the first suggestions Frere made was that 
military officers acting as agents for the British Government 
be stationed at Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar. They were to be 
well chosen and have a good knowledge of the country and
22Frere, "East," 598, 578-81.
"Sir Bartle Frere*s Note on lord Lawrence's Memo- 
randum on the Central Asian Question, Dated 4th November, 
1874,” iu Frere, Afghanistan. 71, 68.
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language. Non-interference in Afghan internal affairs was 
to be the rule; the main task of the agents was to support 
the ruler in every way possible. Second, the Amir of Afghan­
istan had to understand that conducting relations in a manner 
contrary to British interests would result in him being 
treated as an enemy. The British Government would then take 
appropriate action.2 "^
Britain was ever a trading nation, and Bartle Frere 
reflected its concern about any foreign intrusion into its 
markets in his article on "Russia and England in the East." 
Two groups of expansionists were represented in Moscow. The 
first was made up of the Czar and a small clique of high 
officials who opposed active expansion into Central Asia. 
Their reasoning was that Russia did not possess a large 
enough budget to administer such an empire. Those in favor 
of a truly active expansionist policy included ultra­
nationalist politicians, military men (who did not have to 
worry about the cost of administration), Russianized Germans, 
and merchants. Public support went to the latter group. The 
presence of the merchants constituted the strongest impulse 
driving the Russian advance. There was a deep-seated dislike 
among Russian merchants of their exclusion from the Asian 
markets by British competitors. They were strongly protect­
ionist in character, and wanted a conquered Asian territory
2^Frere to Sir John Kaye (12 June 1874), Ibid. 31,
34-35.
which they could monopolize for trade. One thing seemed 
certain to Frere: India’s Northwest Frontier was certain to
go on a war footing if Afghanistan either let Russian agents
25m  or allowed merchants and travelers to move around freely.
He had already outlined a move to prevent such a situation
in his letter of 1874 to Sir John Kaye: the British envoy
to the Amir was to negotiate a commercial treaty. It was to
give Britain parity at least with other countries. If it was
not done Britain might he barred from Afghanistan because the
Russians distrusted its commercial power.
The letter of 1874 from Frere to Sir John Kaye also
discussed important measures to be taken for the defense of
the Indian frontier. An essential move was the occupation
of Quetta, as permitted under previous agreements with the
27Khan of Kalat. A railroad was needed to Peshawar from 
Karachi, via Multan and Lahore, with a spur to the Bolan Pass, 
and an extension by artillery road to Quetta. The occupation 
of Quetta served a two-fold purpose. First, it was a useful 
watch post for southern Afghanistan. Second, it had the
25Erere, "East," 583, 538, 587, 597.
26flSir Bartle Frere!s Note on Lord Lawrence’s Memo­
randum on the Central Asian Question, Bated 4th November,
1874," in Frere, Afghanistan. 63#
Frere favored stimulation of commerce on the Indus 
and in Karachi in order to keep tribes attached to the British. 
Frere to Lord Canning (1 December 1860), Martineau, Frere, I, 
240-41.
27His great fear about Quetta, he said, was that a 
French or Russian adventurer might one day capture it. Frere 
to Lord Elphinstone (25 March 1858), Martineau, Frere, I, 237*
potential of becoming a rallying point for the defense of 
India beyond the Indus if an invasion came in that sector.
It would also be a force on the flank of any advancing enemy 
in such case as the invasion came through the Kyber Pass and
O Q
Kabul. This whole concept was, however, attacked by John
Lawrence. The occupation, he noted, was open to question on
two counts: diplomatically, the Afghans might conclude that
Britain was contemplating an invasion; second, the military
cost of an occupation, a reserve in the Sind as. a backup
force, and fortification of the Bolan rail line would not
make it worth the effort. British interests in India vis-a-
vis Russia were best represented by British insistence to
the Russians that India was to be defended at all costs. The
suggestions made by Frere were, in the opinion of Lawrence,
ineffectual for stopping any real Ri^.ssian move towards India.
They would probably lead to a situation such as had existed
29in 1838, ruining Indian finances in the process. The best 
policy, Lawrence concluded, was to make India as prosperous 
and contented as possible. The frontier tribes were to be 
assured at the same time that neither territory nor independ­
ence was threatened. If the Russians appeared, they would be
faced by a wall of allied tribes to impede their advance.
OQ
Frere to Sir John Kaye (12 June 1874), in Frere, 
Afghanistan. 34, 36.
29•^Memorandum by the Right Hon. Lord Lawrence on the 
Central Asian Question.” Ibid. 52-53, 48-49.
30 r Bosworth R. Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence (2 vols.;
New York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1885), II, 379.
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A dispatch from Bartle Frere to Lord Salisbury in
March 1876 provided an outline of what Frere believed should
be done respecting Afghanistan and the Indian border. It
showed that he had perhaps moderated some of his proposals.
He did not think that Calcutta was cognizant of what was
happening on the border. Frere again expressed his opinion
that Russia’s aggressive moves could only be met by a frontier
based on a central premise. That premise was that Afghanistan
serve as a buffer between Russia and Britain in Central Asia;
its accomplishment was through British friendship with the
Amir. The Amir’s territory was safe as long as he remained
friendly with the British; if not, aggression would follow
f,by our instinct of self-preservation.11 The Amir might also
be threatened by other alliances with powers such as Persia
or Kalat, Frere also suggested that the envoy to the Amir’s
court might be able to reside in the Punjab, as long as he
31had assistants in Afghanistan itself. This was a change 
in attitude, perhaps to make the proposals more palatable to 
the Amir, or to obtain support of the Punjab administrators.
Before any concrete action was taken on Afghanistan, 
three events followed in rapid succession during 1875 and 
1876 that strengthened British power in India and detracted 
somewhat from Russian moves towards the Indian border. On 
8 July 1875, Disraeli had announced to the House of Commons
^Frere to Lord Salisbury (3 March 1876), Martineau, 
Frere. II, 145-49*
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that the Prince of Wales was making a trip to India with the
aim of binding it closer to Britain. Sir Bartle Prere was
32
appointed guide for the party. He was, as usual, concerned
about impressions, and recommended that £100,000 be allocated
for presents to the Indian princes instead of the £60,000
already appropriated. He wrote that presents from Indian
princes worth thousands of pounds required the return of more
than a ”trumpery" little gift. His mind was eased when the
Indian Government agreed to provide the necessary money.^
Prere had tried to persuade Gladstone to buy all the
34.
Suez Canal shares in 1873, only to be rebuffed. While in 
Egypt on the way to India in October 1875, the Prince of 
Wales presented the son of the Khedive with the Star of India. 
It was only in November, when Disraeli bought the Khedive's 
6/17 share of the Suez Canal for Britain, that the signif5 cance
33
of the act by the Prince of Wales became apparent. . The
British, as a result, developed a strong interest in Egypt
36
that eventually led to a complete takeover. Prere had 
written that, with the opening of the Suez Canal, India had
32The Annual Register. 1875 (Part I), 58, 114. 
^Martineau, Prere. II, 127-29.
54Ibid, 150.
^ The Annual Register. 1875 (Part I), 112-13.
^ R .  C. K. Ensor. England. 1870-1914. Vol. XIV of The 
Oxford History of England, ed. by Sir George Clark (15 vols.; 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936-1965), 37-38. Hereinafter
referred to as Ensor, England.
57become a Mediterranean power. The purchase of the Suez 
Canal shares made its position secure.
The third move to strengthen British power in India 
during 1875-1876 was the use of the title "Empress (or 
Emperor) of India11 for the reigning British monarch. Prere 
had recommended in 1857 that such a step be taken in order
" T O
to restore British prestige after the Mutiny; Disraeli had 
also lobbied for it in Britain. The issue lay dormant
until 1876, when Queen Victoria insisted she be invested with 
the title; in view of the intensity of her demand, Disraeli 
acceded.^ The measure was opposed by the Liberals, but it 
passed through the House of Commons.^ It had long been 
dreamed of by those concerned with British power in India 
after the Mutiny, including Prere; the Russian advance towards 
the Indian frontiers provided a good reason for the new title, 
since their ruler was styled f,Emperor.ff It was intended to 
have the same reassuring effect on the Indians as the visit 
of the Prince of Wales.^ Prere, in his report to the Queen
^Martineau, Prere. II, 133.
38rbid, I, 226-27.
59/ William Plavelle Monypenny and G-eorge Earle Buckle, 
The Life of Benjamin'Disraeli. Earl'of Beaconsfield (6 vols.; 
London: John Murray, 1910—1920}, V, 446-57. Hereinafter
referred to as Monypenny and Buckle, Beaconsfield.
^Robert Blake, Disraeli (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode,
1966), 562.
^Ensor, England. 39.
^Blake, Disraeli. 562-63, 563 n. 1.
on the visit of the Prince, wrote how it had established a
new rapport between the monarchy and the Indian people; her
assumption of the new title had transformed her from sover-
43eign of India's conquerors to its Empress. ^
About the same time, the situation in Afghanistan 
became more heated. By March 1876, Lord Lytton, the new Vice-
„ A A
roy for India chosen to implement a new forward policy, was
writing that the British Government had not been forceful
enough about Central Asia. There should be a clear statement
that the British had paramount interest in Afghanistan, Kalat,
and Baluchistan, and that Russian influence in those areas
could not be tolerated. Also, the occupation of Quetta should
4-5be considered a British right. Negotiations with Kalat in 
1876 allowed such an occupation in 1877. Finally, in November 
1878, the British invaded Afghanistan and forced the Afghans 
to grant everything they asked. The most important concess­
ions were the establishment of a British mission at Kabul at 
the expense of a Russian one, and control of Afghan foreign 
policy. „ The Russians acquiesced to the new British action, 
not wanting to break up the terms of the Congress of Berlin 
so soon, and also due to general exhaustion after a war with 
Turkey. Britain had picked exactly the right moment to move
4^Philip Magnus, King Edward The Seventh (London:
John Murray, 1964), 142.
44C. H. B. P. P .. Ill, 81.
4^Lord Lytton to Prere (26 March 1876), Martineau, 
Prere. II, 155.
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on the Afghans* Success in the early part of the Afghan War 
was tarnished in September 1879, when the British mission in 
Kabul was massacred and British gains put in jeopardy. The 
renewal of war without the threat of Russian intervention, 
however,, soon righted the matter*
Prere had seen the imperialist view he shared with
i
others gain acceptance* British policy in Central Asia was 
one of definite forward movement* The Russians, as Prere 
had foreseen for reasons of his own, had not retaliated* By 
this time, however, Prere was in South Africa, serving as 
High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony. He was 
in the process of fashioning a forward movement of his own.
A better understanding of Prere*s South African policy can 
be gained, however, by examining first some of his ideas 
about Africa.
46C. H. B. E.. III. 103, 105, 106.
CHAPTER V
EAST AFRICA: THE TURKISH THREAT
AND THE SLAYE TRADE
Sir Bartle Frere had left India in 1867 under a cloud 
of disapproval as a result of the failure of the Bank of 
Bombay. His appointment to the Council of India might have 
been, in normal circumstances, a peaceful interlude before 
retirement. It was not to be, however, due to the Turkish 
threat in the Persian Gulf and the problem of the slave trade 
in East Africa. They were more related than might first be 
imagined, and a little of their history must be examined to 
understand why. In 1869, with tha opening of the Suez Canal, 
the Turks began to exert their power in the Arabian Peninsula 
for the first time since the seventeenth century. They sub­
dued the North Yemen tribesmen, and with them Yemen, estab­
lished a Turkish protege at Najid on the Persian Gulf, and 
formed Turkish naval squadrons in the Red Sea and Persian 
Gulf. It was enough to perturb the British, who had come to 
regard the Arabian Peninsula as their own preserve.^
One British group watched the progress of Turkish 
influence closely, for they worried about its threat to India,
1R. J. Gavin, "The Bartle Frere Mission to Zanzibar, 
1873." The Historical Journal. Y, No. 2 (1962), 127-28. 
Hereinafter referred to as Gavin, "Mission."
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with a sizeable Moslem population* Besides Frere, the group 
included Badger, an expert on the Arabs, Kaye at the Indian 
Office, and Rawlinson, like Frere, on the India Council.
It was the religious and somewhat nationalistic rhetoric 
that the Turks had begun to use that caught their attention. 
The possible effect it could have on Moslem elements in India 
was demonstrated, they felt, by the episode of the Hadrami 
chieftain. On one occasion when two chieftains were arguing, 
the Sherif of Mecca sent one of them a warning about his 
subordinate position to the Sultan of Constantinople as both 
political and spiritual head of all Moslems. A complication 
lay in the fact that the chieftain’s nominal suzerain, the 
Hizam of Hyderabad, was very troublesome to British Indian 
officials. The long-term implications of the incident to 
Britain’s position in India impressed Frere and the others. 
Their apprehension was reinforced by three other events: a
Moslem revival in the East; the important part Moslems had
played in the Indian Mutiny as pointed out in Kaye’s History;
2and, the murder of the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, by a Moslem.
At the same time, other British Government officials 
were concerning themselves with the problem of keeping Muscat 
and Zanzibar in the British camp in view of Turkish moves 
into the Arabian Peninsula. Politicians, on the other hand, 
wanted to leave well alone; an impasse had been reached by 
1871. Government officials wanted Britain to pay a subsidy
2Ibid. 128-29, 129 n. 44.
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due Muscat from Zanzibar; in return, Zanzibar would promise 
to suppress the slave trade. The report, issued in January 
1870, was designed to keep everyone happy while not abandon­
ing the traditional British attitude towards slavery. The 
officials had affirmed the old British policy towards the 
Middle East from 1820 to 1860. Fashioned by the Governor of 
Bombay, Mountstuart Elphinstone, this policy had depended on 
informal ties with progressive commercial elements in the 
area (chiefly Zanzibar and Muscat). Essentially, it aimed at
free trade, eliminating the slave trade, and keeping out
•5
other European powers.
The center of the East African slave trade was
Zanzibar. Operations emanated from there, and the Sultan of
Zanzibar was suzerain along the East African coast north of
Cape Delgado. Previous efforts to end the trade, including
the use of a British squadron to help the weak navy of the
Sultan, had been unsuccessful. Just how flourishing this
trade was had been outlined to an unsuspecting British public
when David Livingstone was at home between 1856 and 1858.^
When Britain asked the new Sultan, Barghash, to begin practi-
5cable elimination of slavery in 1870, he refused. This
^T.bid. 129-36.
*C. H. B. E .. Ill, 68.
_  . . .
R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa. 
1856-90: The Slave Trade and the Scramble (London: Paber
and Eaber, n.d.), 165. Hereinafter referred-to as Coupland, 
Exploitation.
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coincided with the complete impasse in 1871 between Govern­
ment officials and politicians about British policy in the 
area. Agitation began in June in the House of Commons for a 
complete suppression of the slave trade. The Government 
decided to appoint a select committee in order to quieten the 
agitation. It recommended, in turn, elimination of the
slave trade without compensation, for it believed that abol-
7
ition could only help Zanzibar’s trade.
At this point Sir Bartle Prere came into the picture.
He had talked with Livingstone while the latter was in 
Bombay in 1863 and had expressed a strong interest in the
Q
abolition of the slave trade. A strong bond of friendship
q
had been established between the two men since then* meeting. 
The refusal of the Government to act on either the inter­
departmental report presented in 1870 or the recommendations 
of the select committee in 1871, led Sir Bartle to take action. 
Agitation, chiefly inspired by him during 1872, brought the 
Government around, and that same year he was appointed to 
renegotiate a new treaty with Zanzibar forbidding the slave 
trade.^ Instructions from the Earl of Granville at the 
Foreign Office duplicated the recommendations of the inter-
^Gavin, "Mission.,? 136.
7Coupland, Exploitation, 170.
8Ibid, 116.
^The Times (London), 2 November 1872, 5.
10Gavin, "Mission," 134-41.
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departmental committee of 1870. Muscat and Zanzibar were to 
be reminded of their previous agreements to suppress the slave 
trade, and Frere had the power to amend the proposed treaties 
if either party agreed. In the case of Zanzibar, Britain 
pledged to pay the 40,000 crowns awarded by Canning in 1861 
if her Sultan agreed to suppress the slave trade.^ Frere 
was also instructed to report on the most effective dispos­
ition of consular officers and naval forces for ending the
12slave trade, and on means of disposing of liberated slaves.
Frere left for his East African mission on 21 November 
1872, arriving in Alexandria aboard the Enchantress on 14 
December.: After interviews with the Khedive at Cairo on the 
status of the slave trade in his country, Sir Bartle left for 
Zanzibar on 4 January, arriving there eight days later. A 
conversation with the Sultan on 11 February revealed that he 
was stalling on the question of abolition. The Sultan empha­
sized the effect of a recent hurricane on Zanzibar, the need 
for a phasing out of the slave trade, and concern about the 
welfare of his Arab subjects. Four days later Frere left for 
a tour of the southern slave ports, and the next month for a 
tour of the northern part of the Sultan’s dominion. Here he 
was able, in accordance with instructions from Lord Granville,
^ B .  S. P ., "Correspondence Respecting Sir Bartle 
Frere’s Mission to the East Coast of Africa," LXI, 1872-1873, 
C.-820, No. 3 (9 November 1872), 772-73. Hereinafter 
referred to as B. S. P .. C 820.
^Ibid, No. 4 (9 November 1872), 774.
to obtain renewals of treaties to suppress the slave trade
from Nukeeb Hilah-bin-Mahamed and the Nukeeb of Makallah.
The same hald true of the Sultan of Muscat, and the last
stronghold was the Sultan of Zanzibar. This problem was
remedied in May 1873 when Lord Granville'wrote John Kirke,
British Consul at Zanzibar, to threaten the Sultan with a
blockade if a treaty to suppress the slave trade was not
signed; the treaty was signed and Kirke sent it to Lord
13Granville the following month.  ^ Frere had succeeded, at 
least for the time-being, in reviving the old idea of an 
informal British empire built upon the "universal applic-
T A
ability of British concepts of progress.”
The dispatches sent back by Sir Bartle Frere reflected 
the traditional Bombay policy; in addition, they showed a 
tendency to use ideas developed in India to solve a new prob­
lem. This was shown, for example, in his recommendations for 
coping with slavery in Egypt. The Khedive, in talks with 
Frere, had expressed the view that it would be difficult to 
ban slavery in Egypt without striking at its source. An oiit- 
right ban was not feasible because slavery had existed in 
Egypt much too long before its present rulers had arrived.
"^Ibid, Nos. 6 (21 November 1872), 11 (15 December
1872), 12 *(*24""December 1872), 14 (4 January 1873), 18 
(14 January 1873), 26 (15 February 1873), 30 (14 February
1873), 39 (15 March 1873), 47 (15 April 1873), 48 (16 April 
1873), 49 (16 April 1873), 46 (15 May 1873), 57 (6 June 1873), 
776-77, 788, 794, 806-08, 846, 859-60, 863, 858, 923.
■^Gavin, "Mission," 147.
In any case, he did not "believe that more than 400 slaves
15were sold illegally in Egypt each year. Sir Bartle himself 
"believed that the figure was much higher, in view of the 
growing affluence of the people in Lower Egypt; indeed, it 
was the only way to satisfy domestic needs. He cited, instead, 
information that thousands of slaves were sold upcountry in 
"rich remote provincial towns seldom visited by influential 
Pranks."16
The answer to stamping out the slave trade in Egypt 
depended on the fact that a larger proportion than before 
was coming into Egypt from the Red Sea. The largest contin­
gent still came through the valley of the Nile by land into 
Lower Egypt. It was difficult to gauge the popularity of 
the Red Sea route because there was no consular service in 
the area; it was impossible to stop the Turkish ships which 
carried them to get an accurate count. This problem did, 
however, point to a solution. Britain should extend its 
consular service into the area and negotiate ”with Turkey 
for extended facilities of inquiry.” Eradicating the slave 
trade, from a strictly British standpoint, depended on the 
extended use of the consular service, which consisted only 
of a consular agent at Suez. Such an extension would give 
the Consul General more than the chance information he had
~^B. S. P .. C 820, Encl. 1 to No. 13 (1 January 1873),
778.
Ibid, Encl. 2 to No. 13 (1 January 1873), 780.
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received previously from Egyptian sources. The first step 
was to station someone nominally at Asyut, to he able to move 
about the valley of the Nile and intercept slave traders. He 
should be young, a military officer, and a gentleman. The 
ability to speak Arabic was essential, but he should not be 
native to the region. A second part of the consular agency 
was to consist of resident consular agents at Jiddah and 
Massowah. Permission would be needed from the Consul General 
for the "Consul at Suez or any other of his subordinates11 to 
check other major ports along the Red Sea at irregular inter-
17vals for evidence of slave trade or anything else significant.
In the short run, Prere advocated that the Khedive 
should set up a special bureau within his police establishment 
to stop any illegal slave trade in Egypt. It would also care 
for liberated slaves and keep an accurate count of liberated 
and domestic slaves. Cases of cruelty to slaves reported by 
consuls would also be investigated by this unit. The nation­
ality of the person heading the unit was. not mentioned by 
Prere, but he implied that he would be European, Such an 
official would be one "whose nationality, character, and 
antecedents will justify the confidence of His Highness and 
of all friendly Powers interested in the question." Sir 
Bartle envisioned industrial schools operated by a charity
group connected with the slave bureau, teaching a trade and
18caring for liberated slave children.
17Ibid. 780-81. 18Ibid. 782.
6 3
An end to the slave trade would be a certainty only 
when slaveholding had been abolished in Egypt, possibly in 
stages, with the children being freed first. On the other 
hand, continuance of slavery would ultimately lead to the 
rise of a caste group, with the slaves doing all the labor. 
Sir Bartle Frere believed that anyone who had seen such a 
situation in India would not want to see it happen in Egypt. 
Such a course only impeded progress, as had so often been 
the case in India. It was also a barrier to any Egyptian 
advance towards the south, which otherwise would be the 
advancement of an enlightened and civilized state. No 
European government, Frere wrote, was going to allow expan­
sion of a state with such an "unnatural, hideous" evil as 
19slavery.
An argument used by Frere against slavery in Egypt
was reiterated in his discussion of slavery in Turkey. He
noted that the Koran gave specific reasons for slavery, but
it did not include the type of indiscriminate slavery prac-
20ticed in Egypt. Regarding Turkey, he reminded the Earl of 
Granville that certain interpretations of Moslem law took a 
dim view of slavery. Frere suggested that the Government 
pressure the Porte to issue decrees enforcing such interpret­
ations. The problem in Turkey, as in Egypt, was that slave- 
holding was legal; trade in slaves was supposedly illegal,
19Ibid. 782-84. 20Ibid. 781
but was definitely tolerated. Forcing Turkey to abandon
slavery was "not a question of religion, or of political
influence, but of common humanity." Turkey was taking a
very big chance by continuing the practice, because it could
expect no support from European governments of any political
21persuasion in the future. Turks failed to enforce a ban 
against the slave trade because of the lack of means. Con­
cessions were needed similar to those Britain had had before 
from other nations to ensure that the slave trade ban was
effective; otherwise every slave dhow plying the Red Sea was
22sure to hoist the Turkish flag to ensure protection.
Other steps had to be taken to eradicate the slave
trade. Frere had written, in February 1873, that all the
trade along the East Coast was in Indian hands. They supplied
the capital that financed the slave trade. The Rao of Kutch
had lent a willing hand in the early part of the mission by
issuing a proclamation to his subjects in Zanzibar and Muscat.
It had ordered them to desist from the slave trade, and Frere
considered it "one of the modes in which the Rao1s aid is
likely to be of special use." The only way to get the Indians
out of the slave trade, however, was to stop it; short of that,
punishment should be given out to the Indians, British sub-
23jects or not, when implicated in it. For the southern part
21Ibid. No. 17 (1 January 1873), 791-92.
22Ibid. Encl. 2 to No. 13 (1 January 1873), 781-82.
2hbid, Nos. 31 (27 February 1873), 15 (10 January
1873), Encl. 1 to No. 51 (7 May 1873), 808-09, 788-89, 875.
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of East Africa, a consul was needed on Mozambique to spur 
Portugal to action in suppressing slavery in its territories. 
This would, at the same time, attract British traders and 
capital to keep the slave trade in check. The consul would 
also be able to make periodic visits to the Comoro Islands 
and Johanna. Slaveholding in Northeast Africa, principally 
among the Somalis, could be checked by the cultivation of 
friendship by consuls at Aden and Zanzibar, and by enforce-
O A
ment of non-slaveholding agreements already made.
Bartie Frere had been successful at least in securing 
agreements with powers in Eastern Africa on ending the slave 
trade. British interests there had once again been secured, 
but what of the future? Frere discussed that question often 
in the.following years, beginning with problems he dealt with 
during his mission to Zanzibar. In February 1873, the Earl 
of Granville asked Frere his opinion of using Johanna as 11 a 
depot of captured slaves . . ., and as to the probability of
finding employment for them with safety to their freedom.11
25Frere replied in favor of using Johanna, whose inhabitants 
he later referred to as the most intelligent and civilized 
of any of the people of the region. No doubt he had been
24Ibid. Nos. 40 (3 April 1873), 56 (29 Kay 1873),
846, 914-lFI
2■’ibid, Nos. 21 (28 February 1873), 44 (7 April 1873), 
798, 857.
26Ibid, Encl. "Memorandum on Disposal of Liberated
Slaves,1 to No. 58 (7 May 1873), 896.
71
impressed by its decision two months before to forbid any
further introduction of slaves and to accept freed slaves
27landed by British cruisers. By doing this, Johanna ful­
filled two of the conditions essential, in Sir Bartle’s view, 
for a liberated slave depot: "free, self-sustaining commun­
ities" and "improvement in civilization, and education of
OQ
those not too old to learn." Certainly he was thinking 
also about the Fraser estate he had observed at Kokotoni,
Zanzibar. A collection of former slaves did all the work on
(
the estate, including operation of the machinery. They were
well fed and cared for medically. Two points stood out in
Frere's mind about their behavior. Sexual depravity common
among slaves had been replaced by family life; there was
also the beginnings of the use of manufactured goods. Fraser
also employed slaves from neighboring estates on their two-
day weekly holidays, paying them prevailing wages. What
little crime there was resulted from this influx and not from
the residents. Frere expressed the opinion that this would
be the result of the abolition of the slave trade and the
29accompanying introduction of Indian or European capital.
The visit to the Fraser estate had an effect on 
Frere*s thinking, but it was allied with a religious outlook
27Ibid. Encl. 1 to No. 34 (12 March 1873), 814.
OQ
Ibid, Encl. "Memorandum on Disposal of Liberated 
Slaves," to No. 58 (7 May 1873), 887.
29Ibid. No. 25 (12 February 1873), 802-06.
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he had inherited from David Livingstone. The latter’s work 
in tropical Africa, as he himself conceived it, was not only 
to convert the natives; instead, it was to diffuse the prin­
ciples that had made for social progress in Britain, 11 the 
arts and sciences of civilisation.” Livingstone thought that 
the reason for African "backwardness was their concentration 
on the material aspects of life, their ignorance, and tribal 
structure, which splintered them and ’’laid /African society7 
ever open to violence.” Livingstone was in turn the inspira­
tion for the University Mission to Central Africa which held 
Anglo-Catholic views, a result of being founded by English 
High Churchmen. There was an emphasis on the presence of a 
bishop, and the philosophy of establishing ’’centres of 
Christianity and civilisation for the promotion of true 
religion, agriculture and lawful commerce.” Two problems
plagued the U.M.C.A. however: the shortage of funds and
30short tours because of bad working conditions. These prob­
lems were certainly in Frere’s mind when-he later theorized 
on missions generally.
Another influence on Frere was undoubtedly the Roman 
Catholic missionary station at Bagamayo, along the East 
African coast, which he visited, and with which he was 
impressed. The station was built upon the time-honored
-^Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa 
fend ed.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1965), 10-13.
Hereinafter referred to as Oliver, Factor.
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principles of Catholic missions since they had started in 
Europe: civilization dispensed with religion; appointment
by Rome of mission heads; widespread giving, with allowances 
made for national congregations to give to one mission in
*51
money and manpower. These ideas were brought out by Sir
Bartle in remarks before the Church Congress of the Curch of
England in 1873. The method used by the Church, he said, in
the years from the sixth to the thirteenth century to convert
the pagans of Northern Europe was to evangelize in the form
of a model civilized community. This community contained all
the elements— clerical and lay— of a Christian society.
Roman Catholic and some Protestant organizations (including
the London Missionary Society) had continued the practice.
They had been quite successful, as a result, in bringing the
'52benefits of civilization to others.
Sir Bartle Prere noted that the Church of England!s 
missionary efforts had been heavily weighted towards the 
clerical at the expense of other activities. These activities 
could be restructured to resemble the form taken by missions 
in the sixth to thirteenth centuries, namely a civilized 
community in which converts could live. His own ideas would, 
he believed, give the clerical element more time for preaching 
rather than divert their attention from it. As for organiz-
31rbid, 19-20.
•20
Sir Bartle Prere, "Remarks on the Organization of 
Missions to Uncivilized Populations," Official Report of the 
Church Congress (Bath, 1873)» 94-95.-
l \ r
ation, a bishop would he appointed wherever there was a mixed 
lay and clerical mission* This was needed because of the 
complexity of the operation and in view of the success of 
mission stations of other denominations where a superior was 
present. The secular element would include such people as 
doctors, nurses, linguists, schoolteachers, printers, agri­
culturists, and craftsmen. There would have to be a loosening 
of bonds between the societies and missionaries, though it 
would probably affect the lay more than the clerical element 
of the mission. Frere thought that the recruitment of men, 
and perhaps even money, should be up to the mission itself 
instead of being done by the laborious method of requesting 
it through the society headquarters as previously. Mission 
efforts would be enhanced by the identification of special 
parts of the country with certain missions, from the stand- 
point of real interest and money advanced to it.
Sir Bartle Frere looked further into the problem of 
missions in Eastern Africa. Use of the secular element to 
assist the missionary and easing the line (often imaginary) 
between service at home and abroad were possible only by 
shortening the time to be spent overseas. A limited amount 
(two or three years) of missionary work was as commendable 
as work on a lifetime basis. The formation of a body to 
collect material on past and present exertions of missionaries 
of all religious bodies was a good idea; this in turn could
35rbid, 94-101.
take on a form such as the Board of Foreign Missions in
America. It should discuss and solve differences such as
territorial spheres of work, and perhaps produce a modern
■54.
translation of the Bible.
The implications of such involvement in Africa were 
also discussed by Sir Bartle Frere. Charges of ”*equivocal 
and entangling engagements *11 would be founded only if ”we 
neglect our plain duty in dealing with semi-civilised or 
savage neighbours.” Protection of citizens was essential, 
by friendly remonstrance or force. In either case, the sover­
eign, whether barbaric or semi-civilized, had to understand 
the power and determination of Britain to protect its citizens. 
Avoidance of ”*equivocal and entangling engagements*” would 
be greatly facilitated by the employment of consular agents 
in Africa to keep an eye on the country and Englishmen there,
In case of war, such men would be invaluable in advising how 
it should be conducted.
On East African missions in general, Sir Bartle Frere 
believed that nowhere in the world at that time was there as
0 «
wide a field for missionary work. Two factors made East 
Africa unusually suitable for missionary work: first, little
Sir Bartle Frere, Eastern Africa as a Field for 
Missionary Labour: Four Letters to His Grace the Archbis'hon
of Canterbury (London: John Murray, 1874), 95-9&V 113-14•
Hereinafter referred to as Frere, Africa.
^ S i r  Bartle Frere, Inaugural Address /to the African 
Section7. Journal of the Society of Arts. XXII (November 21, 
1873-November 13, 1874j, 204-07.
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work had been done by "Christian nations" before; and second, 
no real obstacles existed to impede the growth of Christian­
ity. The Comoro Islands off the coast would provide a good 
healthy place for mission stations. Petishism was not common 
in East Africa, and an absence of belief in any abstract 
concepts of being was the most conspicuous aspect of the 
region. The natives were unable, it seemed, to conceive of 
any non-physical object. The problem of East African natives 
was that they were, isolated from neighbors, without the type 
of "basis of moral law" provided by Christianity, which was 
a prerequisite for "orderly and progressive communities." 
Christianity, on the other hand, contained the unifying bond 
needed to bring the scattered atoms of Africans together into 
progressive, unified communities. East Africans tended 
"rapidly to assimilate themselves to any more highly-civilised 
race with which they may be brought into contact."
The abolition of slavery entailed reviving legitimate 
commerce in Africa. The only way to do so was through the 
spread of "Christianity and Christian civilisation and enlight-
•2*7
enment." In an article on Livingstone written in 1874, Sir 
Bartle Prere discussed this in more detail. He believed that, 
as a result of Livingstone*s work, there would be a great 
stimulation of commerce with the Africans. Prere was in
^Prere, Africa, 9, 48, 15, 70.
57rbid, 119-
77
complete agreement with "Livingstone’s estimate of geograph­
ical discoverers as being simply the pioneers of commerce and 
civilisation.11 Trade on a greater scale than ever before 
would follow protection for the trader and abolition of the 
slave trade. For clothing and metal work especially the
Africans could certainly supply such raw materials as oils,
■2 0
metal, and cotton.
Underlying the optimism of Sir Bartle Prere was a 
commercial revolution in East Africa. Abolition of the slave 
trade was causing a depression in the short run, but it 
would help bring prosperity to industry and trade in the long 
run. Perhaps more important was the construction of the Suez 
Canal, which would put a stop to the use of transshipment 
facilities on the coast. The Sultan of Zanzibar could be the 
keystone to any hope for East Africa. He ruled over a large 
area, came from a civilized race, and protected Christian 
missionaries spreading civilization over East Africa. He was 
also "closely connected . . . with some of the great trading 
communities of the East, and ruling over a region of unsur­
passed natural capabilities, he may reasonably hope for a 
great destiny awaiting his race in Eastern Africa." The 
Salvation of East Africa, therefore, was commerce. It had 
coal and an abundant supply of labor* Both were attractive 
to the capitalist. Any government, whether in South Africa,
^8Sir H. B. E. Prere, "Dr. Livingstone,” G-ood Words 
(1874), 283-85*
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the Portuguese possessions, or the area in the north under 
the Sultan of Zanzibar, could insure its prosperity through 
"protection of life and property*" This was very important 
to Prere, because he believed that the uncivilized nature of 
the African natives could be traced to their isolation, some­
thing that should cease now that they had met with civilized 
peoples. Negroes who had had only a "very imperfect amount 
of civilisation" through conversion to Islam showed marked 
physical and moral improvement. The rewards that could 
follow from conversion to Christianity, a greater civilizing 
force than Islam, could be expected to be even greater.
Sir Bartle Prere played an important role in the
development of thought first laid down by Livingstone. He
had put the arts of civilization on a plane with the religious
message, whereas Livingstone wanted the former only as a
preliminary to the latter. Prere1s ideas were not popular,
however. They brought down the wrath of the evangelicals in
both England and Germany upon him. Being old-fashioned, they
wanted only the message carried and nothing else. Preretown
was Established in 1875 to follow his ideas, but was never
thought by its mother society, the Church Missionary Society,
41to be an exceptional case of mission work.
^ S i r  H. B. E. Prere, "Zanzibar A Commercial Power," 
Macmillanys Magazine, XXXII (July 1875), 287-08.
^°Prere, "Dr. Livingstone," 284.
^Oliver, Pactor. 23-25.
The importance of Frere*s thoughts on Eastern Africa 
and Africa in general lay in their potential applicability 
to South Africa. It was questionable what course Frere would 
take if some Africans disagreed with his theory and refused 
to submit to civilizing influences. It was precisely this 
question he had to deal with in South Africa some years later.
CHAPTER VI
SOUTH AFRICA
The career of Sir Bartle Frere in South Africa is 
the beginning of a story that would take years to unfold.
He was not the first to attempt a policy of confederation of 
the South African states, but it was the first time it had 
a fair chance of success. It was, in this instance, to be a 
failure, but in 1910 was finally brought to fruition. The 
story of Frere in Africa, then, is a very important part of 
South African history; it inspired both South Africans and 
students of British Empire to try again some twenty-five 
years later.
Interestingly enough, the majority of past, present 
and future participants in South African confederation were 
present at a banquet held for Frere in London on 28 February 
1877. Hosted by a group of Natal merchants and "others inter­
ested in South Africa,” it was given to celebrate Frere*s 
appointment as Governor of the Cape Colony. Among those 
present were the Earl of Kimberley, Earl of Carnarvon, and 
Marquis of Salisbury.1 The original impetus for confederation 
of Dutch and British states in South Africa had come from the
^ h e  Times (London), 1 March 1877, 6 .
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Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South
Africa, Sir George Grey, in 1859. He was firmly rebuffed by
2
the Colonial Office the next year* The Earl of Kimberley 
had already served in various positions of government, includ' 
ing service in the Eoreign Office, Undersecretary for India, 
and Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. From 1870 to 1874 he had 
been Colonial Secretary in Gladstone’s first administration. 
The Cape Colony had been awarded responsible government in 
1872; Kimberley subsequently noted that possibly the Orange 
Free State and the Transvaal would like to confederate with 
the Cape Colony. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 he 
opposed, but did not split with, the Liberals as a result of 
Gladstone's Russian bias. Kimberley could therefore be con­
sidered an exponent' o f .confederation by evolution.
The Earl of Carnarvon had followed Kimberley's lead 
in trying to federate South Africa. He was experienced at 
the Colonial Office, having been Secretary from 1858 to 1859 
and from 1866 to 1867 in both administrations of Lord Derby. 
Carnarvon was deeply interested in colonial matters and in 
exploring ways of binding Britain and its colonies closer 
together. He had introduced the bill to federate Canada 
before his resignation in March 1867 over differences with
2 • • • • 
Arthur Percival Newton, ed., Select Documents Relat­
ing to the Unification of 3outh Africa (£ vols.; London:
Frank Cass .& Co., 1968), 1-12. Hereinafter referred to as 
Newton, Unification.
Lloyd Charles Sanders, "Wodehouse, John,” D. N. B ., 
Supplement, 1901-1911, III, 695-96.
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Disraeli, and had seen it pass into law the following June, 
While the Conservatives were out of office from December 1868 
to January 1874# Carnarvon had expanded his horizons and urged 
the creation of a federated British Empire.^ Returning to 
office with the Conservatives in February 1874# he became 
Colonial Secretary once again. Carnarvon set to work in 
earnest on South African confederation. He tried from 1875 
until 1876 to arrange a conference of the African states to 
discuss common native problems and his ideas for confederation. 
It came to nothing. The Cape Colony pleaded that a conference 
would only exacerbate problems between its eastern and western 
sections, and the Orange Free State refused to attend. When 
Carnarvon suggested changing the venue from the Cape to London, 
there was even more trouble. The Orange Free State refused 
to discuss anything but native problems, the Cape went unrep­
resented over what they considered unconstitutional pressures 
for confederation, and the South African Republic declined
5
to discuss the proposition.
The appointment of Sir Bartle Frere as Governor and 
High Commissioner was only one stage of a final three-pronged 
effort by Carnarvon to implement his policy of confederation.
Two other moves by Carnarvon reinforced his hand: first, Sir
Theophilus Shepstone declared British sovereignty in April 
1877 over the Transvaal (on the assumption that the Orange
^"Sidney Lee, "Herbert, Henry Howard Molyneux," D. N. B . ,
IX, 646-4 8 .
Newton, Unification. 18-43#
Free State would also be forced to join in a federated South
Africa); second, the South Africa Act was passed in August
1 8 7 7, erecting a framework on which federation could proceed*
6Frere had been agreeable to the Cape governorship. He had 
already given his opinion in 1874 that the Cape Colony was 
Mone of the most important colonial possessions of the 
British Empire,” and a possible rival to Australia in the
7
future.
One of the first difficulties Frere faced when he 
arrived in South Africa was the Ministry of John Molteno. 
Carnarvon had said, in remarks at the Langham Hotel banquet, 
that Frere ”goes out not as the Governor of a Crown Colony, 
but as one who will have to carry on the task of government 
in conjunction with local advisers,” . No qualifications were
Q
made, but Frere replaced Henry Barkly as High Commissioner
and Governor of the Cape Colony because the latter had fallen
9too much under the influence of Molteno. Frere finally had 
to break the hold of the Ministry, and did it in a roundabout 
way. It began on 10 August 1877, after an outbreak of fight­
ing between the Fingo and Galeka tribes at a marriage feast 
in Fingo territory. The Galekas involved in the fight belonged 
to a tribe ruled by Kreli. Skirmishing soon broke out along
6C. H. B . E .. VIII, 467-73.
7
Frere, "Inaugural Address,” 204*
SThe Times,(London), 1 March 1877, 6 .
9C. H. B. E.. VIII, 472.
the borders of the two groups.^ The Cape Colony became 
actively involved on 26 September 1877, when the Galekas 
attacked a detachment of Frontier Armed Mounted Police, under 
Commander Griffith, and Fingo allies barely inside the Cape 
border with Kreli's Country. This particular force was driven 
back with heavy losses into their own territory, and in a 
general advance on 9 October, Commander Griffith burned 
Kreli*s kraal. It looked for a time as if Kreli might ask 
for terms; this hope was shattered, however, when the Galekas 
slipped back across the Bashee and returned to their old 
homesteads as the colonials withdrew. The 24th Regiment was 
sent to reinforce Griffith,^ and reports circulated of plans 
by Kreli to infilitrate the Cape Colony and incite the Gaikas.
It was against the background of the Galeka uprising 
that Frere became involved in an important constitutional
t
question concerning the definition of the power of a colonial 
governor. The situation came about, Frere wrote, when the 
Molteno Ministry pushed for a campaign in the Tambookie under 
exclusive colonial control. They wanted to create the office
. S . P .. "Further Correspondence Respecting the 
Affairs of South Africa,11 LV, 1878, C.-1961, No. 23 (28 August 
1877), 560-61. Hereinafter referred to as B. S. P .. C 1961.
1;LIbid, Nos* 37 (20 October 1877)i 45 (16 October 
1877) r i u T T I  December 1877), 586, 613, 734.
Ibid, "Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs 
of South Africa," LY, 1878, C.-2000, No. 22 (12 December 1877) 
786. Hereinafter referred to as B. S. P ., C 2000.
of Commanding General of Colonial Forces, under Commandant
Griffith, He would control independent commands of colonials
conducting active operations, Griffith himself was to be
13outside any other command structure. This represented 
only one step from a previous arrangement whereby Griffith 
had considerable autonomy for his command east of the Kei.
He did, however, receive “intimations” and forward reports 
to General Sir Arthur Cunynghame, who was in overall command.^ 
It was not, however, a step Frere was ready to take. He 
turned the idea of “law and usage” on the proposal of the 
Ministry by writing that it negated any contention by Molteno 
that colonial forces could not be commanded by regular British 
officers. He explicitly reminded them of the recent Transkei 
campaign when Commandant Griffith was subordinate to the 
Commander of the Forces. There was, he continued, no real 
distinction between colonial and British forces, because 
both ultimately fell under the command of a Governor as 
Commander-in-Chief. The relationship of the Governor to his 
ministers was to take their advice and record his opposition
13B. S . P .« “Further Correspondence Respecting the 
Affairs of South Africa," LV, 1878, C.-2079, Nos. 53 
(5 February 1878), 42 (24 January 1878), 97, 71. Hereinafter 
referred to as B. S. P ., C 2079.
■^George McCall Theal, History of South Africa from 
1873 to 1884: Twelve Eventful Years (2 vols.; London;
George Allen & Unwin, 1919), I, 64. Hereinafter referred to 
as Theal, History.
if lie had a valid reason for doing so. He felt that he had
15followed such a course.
The Molteno Ministry replied to Prerefs remarks on 
2 Pebruary 1878. Their minute asserted that the cabinet was 
entrusted by the Cape Parliament with the conduct of govern­
mental business. This gave it collective control over milit­
ary operations in the field and it could delegate such 
authority to any one of the ministers, including the Commiss­
ioner of Crown Lands and Public Works. Colonial forces had 
to be formally placed under the control of General Cunynghame 
for him to excercise any authority over them. Only if that 
were done by the Cape Government could authority be effective 
over any part of the colonyfs population. Relying on preced­
ent, the minute noted it would be a complete reversal if 
command of military operations, for which the colony was 
paying, was turned over to imperial officers. Neither colony 
nor ministers would tolerate such a step. Military operations 
conducted in the name and with the money of the Cape Colony 
necessitated the naming of the commander of such operations
by the Ministry. The Government ensured that it controlled
16such operations only by using this prerogative. In his 
f,Minute from the Governor in answer to Minute of Mr. Molteno, 
dated Pebruary 2, 1878” Prere referred to his Indian experi-
15B. s. p.. C 2079. Encl. 1 to No. 86 (11 May 1878),
209.
16Ibid. 214-15.
ences. He wrote that there were no colonial or regular 
troops in South Africa, except as a colloquial expression.
As British troops in India were part of the Indian army, so 
was also the case in South Africa. Frere admitted only a 
difference in the way the South African and Indian armies 
were financed; ultimately the South African army was the 
responsibility of the South African Ministry as the Indian 
army was the responsibility of the Indian Ministry. The 
crucial note sounded in Frere1s minute was, however, that 
any authority the Ministry possessed was through the 
Governor.*^
Frere wrote to Carnarvon on 5 February 1878 that the
note of 2 February given to him by the Molteno Ministry (at
a meeting of the Executive Council) brought their downfall.
Complete control over military affairs by any cabinet member
was extremely risky, and would have resulted in sending the
Governor, Commander of Forces, and Imperial troops from the
battle scene. Such a course Frere was unwilling to follow,
with its possibility of danger to the Eastern Province. The
Molteno Ministry was dismissed and J. G. Sprigg chosen to
18form a new government. Sir Bartle later summed up his 
reasons for the dismissal. General Sir Arthur Cunynghame 
had, from the beginning of hostilities, held command of 
colonial forces, the ministers being notified formally of
17Ibid, Encl. 2, 217.
■'■®Ibid, No. 54 (5 February 1878), 103.
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this on 20 October 1877. It was not until 2 Pebruary that
formal notification of opposition was given by the Molteno
Ministry, The result was that the Governor as Commander-in-
Chief had to use the constitutional powers at his disposal
when the ministers insisted on divided command of a common
19area of operations. As Prere noted in a letter to R. W.
Herbert, his logic in the dismissal was as follows: it was,
as a rule,, up to the Parliament to choose ministers, but due .
to the prospect of two or three months of ”’unchecked Kaffir
Civil War,1” a stand for the preservation of the constitution
had to be taken; therefore he ’’’asserted an important prerog-
20ative of the crown. 111
Opinion at the time and since has been divided over 
the actions of Prere in dismissing the Molteno Ministry.
J. X. Merriman was blunt, contending that ”it does away with 
any kind of safeguard which Responsible Government was sup­
posed to confer, for it is manifest that a Governor who can 
dismiss his ministers at will and in a huff is much less
controlled than if those ministers were honest Executive 
21Officers.” Clement Goodfellow, a writer on attempts at 
confederation at the time, believes that there was no con-
1 9Ibid. No. 87 (21 May 1873), 252.
■Frere to Herbert (20 Pebruary 1878), Martineau, 
Prere, II, 212.
21 .......
Phyllis lev/sen, ed., Selections from the Corres­
pondence of J.X. Merriman, 1870-1890 (Cape Town: Van Riebeck
Society, 19^0), 41*1
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spiracy against Molteno and in support of Sprigg, who was
more inclined towards federalism. He thinks, instead, that
Molteno was ousted because his actions could prolong the
Kaffir War, thus hindering the movement towards confederation.
Molteno was dismissed for attempting what every Secretary of
State had urged the colonists to do previously, namely take
22over their own defense.
The most detailed study of Frere and the ministerial 
crisis agrees with G-oodfellow only partially. Phyllis Lewsen 
argues that the dismissal was connected with confederation, 
but was more involved. Frere recognized the need to use 
force if necessary to implement confederation. Worried about 
the Zulu threat to the Transvaal, he used the G-aika attack 
as an excuse to get more troops. When Molteno refused to 
sanction such a move, Frere fired him. The Tambookie situ­
ation, Lewsen contends, was overemphasized by Frere and did 
not constitute a serious enough charge to dismiss the Molteno 
Ministry. Started by an over-zealous Merriman who was worried 
about the loyalty of a certain chief, it was quelled by 
Griffith in a few days. It was certainly not worthy of the 
talents of a General Cunynghame. The genesis of the minister­
ial crisis had been on 30 December 1877, when Frere asked 
Molteno to confirm a request for new troops. When Molteno
22Francis Clement Goodfellow, Great Britain and Con­
federation, 1870-1881 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press,
1 $-6 6 ), 154-5 5 . Hereinafter referred to as Goodfellow, 
Confederation.
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refused, Prere sent the request on anyway. The crisis itself 
took shape on 31 January 1878, when Prere sent down an affirm­
ative reply to his troop request, and asked the Ministry to 
sign the colonial treasury warrants. A minute dated the 
same day was the ministers1 reply. An embarrassed Prere then
replied with his own minute the same day. He used a handy
23excuse, dual command, to bring on a confrontation.
Molteno himself, lewsen believes, was correct in 
theory about a separate colonial command; however, with 
imperial forces engaged in the Transkei, it was practicably 
impossible. Molteno therefore foresaw the creation of a 
separate colonial command, formed later in 1879. The Governor 
also had to act with the advice of his Executive Council in 
matters of colonial defense. Prere, on the other hand, was 
correct in demanding a single command; at the same time he 
overdramatized to the Colonial Office the opposition of the 
Molteno Ministry to it and the possible results. In the end,
* Prere constituted a new threat tp responsible government. It 
survived him, however, because of the failure of confederation. 
The principle for which Molteno fought was later enshrined in 
Dominion status.^
23^ Phyllis lewsen, nThe Pirst Crisis in Responsible 
Government in the Cape Colony,” Archives Yearbook for South 
African History  ^ Part II (Cape Town: Minister of the
Interior, 1943; 9 248-52.
24rbid, 256-57, 261.
Lord Carnarvon had written to Prere in December 1876 
that he envisioned the larger part of Africa under nominal
2 5British control, thereby excluding other national aspirants.
Approximately one year later Prere suggested a plan to the
Colonial Office which tested this idea. Prere envisioned a
protectorate stretching from the Atlantic on the west to the
Transvaal-Portuguese border, and again as far north as the
Portuguese possessions. He requested that at least Walwich
Bay be brought under immediate control, because good harbors
were scarce to the north of it. The Boers had already
trekked into the region; there was always the possibility
that a trekking Boer might create another Boer republic
either east or west of the Transvaal. The British would
26then have another Transvaal problem on their hands. The 
Colonial Office, however, was put in a real quandary because 
they neither saw the possibility of foreign intervention nor 
wanted the expense of governing the new annexation. If a 
problem such as this could throw the Colonial Office into 
such confusion, it is questionable just how far one could 
label subsequent acts of Prere as deliberate disobedience; 
perhaps they should instead be viewed in the context of the 
imperial expansion he championed. He was therefore no more
25^ Goodfellow, Confederation117.
26B. s. p .. C 2000, No. 1 (13 November 1877), 743,
745-46.
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27successful with an appeal to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach,
28successor to Carnarvon, to establish a protectorate.
Before confederation could be assured, Sir Bartle
Frere believed that first the native problem would have to
be solved. This meant dealing first with the Pondos and then
29most certainly with the Zulus. Concerning the Pondos,
Frere could report by September 1878 that the problem had 
been solved by the capture of the St. John River estuary the 
preceding month. He considered it to be especially signifi­
cant in case of trouble with Zulus, because British forces
30would not be attacked from the rear.-' The message to Hicks- 
Beach meant, therefore, that he believed war with the Zulus 
to be imminent. Two months previously, he had requested 
that his powers as High Commissioner be expanded. He wanted 
a secretariat, but most of all Deputy Commissioners, report­
ing directly to him while stationed among the independent
"31
African tribes. Obviously something was on Frere's mind. 
That something was the Zulus.
27C. W. De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South 
Africa: A Study in Politics and Economics (London: Frank
Cass & Co.j 1965), 221-227 Hereinafter referred to as 
De Kiewiet, Imperial.
28B. S. P.. "Further Correspondence Respecting the 
Affairs cf South Africa,11 LII, 1879-79, C.-2220, No. 17 
(30 July 1878), 46-48. Hereinafter referred to as B. S. P .. 
C2220.
^G-oodfellow, Confederation. 157-60.
3°B. s. p .. C 2220, No. 60 (3 September 1878), 170-71. 
Goodfellow, Confederation. 157—58.
The problem between Sir Bartle Frere and the Zulus 
can be traced back to a year earlier. In October 1877, Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone had gone to a conference with them, 
hoping to obtain a boundary settlement favorable to the 
Transvaal. He was treated quite rudely by the Zulus, who 
remembered him taking their side formerly while he had been 
native administrator in Natal. The result was that Shepstone 
became a fanatical upholder of the Boer claim, and he warned 
Frere at the same time about the Zulu menace. Frere was 
placed in a difficult situation because Shepstone was speak­
ing about the one subject, native affairs, on which he was 
supposedly an expert. Shepstone had also written that defin­
ite proof of the Dutch claim would be forthcoming. Although 
proof was never sent, Frere expected a favorable verdict 
from the boundary commission formed at the request of Lieu­
tenant Governor Bulwer of Natal. Its verdict was, however, 
a victory for the Zulu claim. If sustained, it would result
in a Boer revolt and the native uprising feared by Frere was
32certain to come.
As one writer has noted, the subjugation of the 
African tribes had a qualification. It was to be for a pol­
itical end, namely confederation, and was not to be social 
subjugation. Such a policy was the reflection of what had
^Donald R. Morris, The Washing of the Spears: A 
History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and its • 
Fall in the Zulu War of 1879 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1965),
26^-71, 274. Hereinafter referred to as Morris, Spears.
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been termed "civilizing policy” in the days of Sir George
Grey.^ Throughout 1878 Sir Bartle Prere spelled out what
such a course meant. His opinion v/as that the tribes could
be "'made to take all the cost and much of the labour of
their own government, but the impulse and the standards of
‘34-right and wrong must be European. 1,1 Most necessary for 
permanent progress to be made was a strong central govern­
ment.^ There was also the problem, as in India, of getting
36the natives to "protect themselves against themselves." 
Gun-carrying among the Kaffirs should be prohibited; courts 
and police could replace the system of fines with a civilized 
concept of offenses against society. A fundamental change, 
Prere thought, was to curtail the arbitrary rule of"the chief 
in order to provide for "reasonable security for life and 
property." A corollary to this would be the provision for 
individual landholding. There was, however, a limit to how 
fast such measures could be accomplished. As Prere wrote, 
"change, like all great revolutions requires time and patience 
to effect peacefully.
Another change which Sir Bartle Frere favored in 
South Africa was the development of an integrated civil serv-
33 Goodfellow, Confederation. 166.
^Martineau, Prere, II, 225.
35B. s . p .. C 2079, No. 5 (9 January 1878), 15.
36Ibid, No. 67 (13 February 1878) 126.
3^Ibid. No. 15 (9 January 1878), 15.
ice. A dispatch dated 1 June 1878 painted the picture, 
familiar in India, of the educated native in a very lonely 
position socially. Often employed as teachers and in com­
merce, they were seldom found in the civil service. No South 
African native civil service comparable to that in India had 
ever existed and would have to be built from scratch. The 
employment of educated natives had been limited to positions 
such as clerks and interpreters in government offices, not 
responsible positions such as magistrates and revenue officers 
on educational merit. Frere thought that the use of educated 
South African native public servants in native kraals would 
be a distinct improvement over what then existed. Having 
uneducated chiefs exercise arbitrary police functions was a
70
disaster, when educated natives could be used instead.
When Frere received the boundary commission report 
in July 1878, he began to devise means to delay its award 
and prepared for war. He sent General Thesiger to inspect 
Natal defenses, which the latter deemed very poor. There 
were too many places for the Zulus to cross and the defense 
force was inadequate. Thesiger recommended the invasion of 
Zululand instead of defense. If Frere himself was having 
any second thoughts about what to do, they were dispelled by
38^ Ibid, "Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs 
of South Africa," 1VI, 1878, C.-2144, No. 107 (1 June 1878), 
606, 609. Hereinafter referred to as C 2144.
^Morris, Spears, 275.
a visit he made in September 1878 to Natal.^ He was besieged 
in Durban by people concerned about the Zulu threat. They 
impressed upon him the ^urgent necessity for protective and 
precautionary measures. Missionaries, laymen, merchants, 
farmers— all met him with the same story and the same appeal.” 
One contemporary writer summed up the general attitude: !fThe
Zulu nation is a bugbear, and the sooner Bogy is got rid of 
the b e t t e r . A t  the end of the month, Sir Bartle sent 
Hicks-Beach a dispatch emphasizing the warlike behavior of 
the Zulus of late and declaring that they were only waiting 
for a good opportunity to put the British in the wrong by 
some means before attacking. He also emphasized the essential 
indefensibility of both the Cape and Natal.
One point in Frere*s dispatch of 30 September 1878 
stood out from everything else. This was the confirmation 
of a report that two women had been dragged back across the 
Natal border to be murdered. The culprits had been two sons 
of Sirayo, a Zulu whom Frere described as very anti-British 
and who had recently come into favor with Cetewayo, the Zulu 
king. Frere thought no fine was enough for the act, because
40De Kiewiet, Imperial. 227 •
^ S i r  John Robinson, A Life Time in South Africa 
(London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1900J, 127-28.
^Alfred Aylward, The Transvaal of Today (Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood and Sons^ 1878), 18.
43B .  S. P.. 0 2220. No. 105 (20 September 1878). 294,
296-97.
it was ”incompatible with, national honour as with the future 
safety of Her Majesty*s Colony.” The Boers were most cer­
tainly watching, and he reminded Hicks-Beach that it was 
because President Burgers could not put down Sikukuni’s 
rebellion that the viability of the Transvaal Republic had 
ended. The stakes were high, for
the future peace of this part of Africa and its progress
in civilization both depend on the issue. It is not 
national pride, but the interests of humanity which 
forbid our acquiescing in failure, or even in delayed 
success.
Later, in a dispatch of 6 October 1878, Prere mentioned two 
more incidents that afforded serious attention, namely the 
detention of two surveyors just inside the Natal border and 
the ejection of farmers from their land at Luneburg and 
Bivana by the Z u l u s I f  his attitude towards the Zulus 
hardened in September, it is not difficult to understand why
from these incidents. They had violated a fixed British line
twice, and, remembering his views on Afghanistan, it is
obvious why Frere took a dim view of such an occurrence; the
Zulus had also violated the principle of civilized behavior 
that Frere had spent a lifetime trying to encourage and which 
he hoped to instill in the South African native.
The request by Frere for troops in late 1878 had the
concurrence of Hicks-Beach, but was opposed by Disraeli. As
44Tbid, C 2220, Nos. 105 (30 September 1878), 111 
(6 October-1878), 294, 296, 298, 305.
45a result, only special service officers were sent.  ^ Sir 
Bartie was advised to send the troops he had to the Natal 
and Transvaal borders for defense. Hicks-Beach was sending 
more troops a month later, but felt that the peace could be 
maintained.^ The boundary award to the Zulus was finally 
made on 11 December 1878, but with conditions attached which 
were to be affirmed in thirty days. They included the sur­
render of those responsible for the murder of the two women 
within twenty days; a fine for detaining the two surveyors; 
trial of Zulus accused of criminal acts, with the right of 
appeal to the Zulu king; return of the missionaries driven 
away; disarming and dismissal of the Zulu army; the admission 
of a Government Resident. ^  The Resident was included, Brere 
wrote, because Cetewayo was too unreliable for a treaty to 
be made with him. The demands were a combination of Brere’s 
ideas on a new native society and retribution for offensive 
acts already perpetrated. He was enforcing, as was his way, 
moral superiority and superior force to right past and possi­
ble future wrongs. Zulu and Briton could be separate but
4.5Monypenny and Buckle, Beaconsfield. VI, 420.
46B. s . p .. C 2220, Hos. 92A (17 October 1878), 119
(21 November 1878), 289, 336.
^Theal, History. I, . 304.
99
peaceful only as long as one recognized the superior power 
of the other. It could not happen while Cetewayo headed the 
Zulus.48
Hicks-Beach was certain that Frere was heading for 
war, and he confessed to Disraeli his inability to control 
him. His one hope was that with the swift defeat of the Zulus
4.9
the Boers would be quiescent. The Cape was indeed prepar—
SOing for war, and Frere gave Lord Chelmsford responsibility
51for enforcing the demands on the Zulus. Disaster followed.
An element of the British force invading Zululand was destroyed
at Isandhlwana, and a fierce public descended upon the
52Disraeli Government. The cabinet issued a charge of cen-
5 5
sure against Frere on 19 March 1879, ana major discussions
were held in both the House of Lords and House of Commons.
Radical Liberals were old opponents of Carnarvon’s confeder- 
54.ation scheme^ and Sir Charles Dilke had written a letter to 
4-8B. S. P ., ’’Further Correspondence Respecting the 
Affairs of South Africa ’* LII, 1878-1879. C.-2222, Nos. 45 
(10 December 1878), 54 (14 December 1878;, 616, 643-45.
^Monypenny and Buckle, Beaconsfield, VI, 421, 423.
^°The Times (London), 6 January 1879, 6.
51B. S. P ., ’’Further Papers Respecting the Affairs 
of South Africa,*' LII, 1878-1879, C.-2242, No. 1 (6 January 
1879), 679.
^Ensor, England, 60-61.
^^Monypenny and Buckle, Beaconsfield, VI, 425-26. 
^Goodfellow, Confederation, 138.
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cc
i'*ie Spectator opposing it. He introduced a motion in the
c £
House of Commons expressing regret at Frere retaining office,
only to see it discussed first in the House of Lords where
57Lord Lansdown introduced it verbatim. Lansdown set the
tone of the Liberal attack in the Lords when he observed that
the actions of Frere had violated previous British policy of
teaching savages civilized ways through good administration
and example. It was a peaceful policy, not one depending on
the sword. Lord Kimberley wondered why Frere was not recalled
as he had completely disobeyed the Secretary; more important,
however, was the fact that it was wrong to remove confidence
in a man by censure but not remove him. Sir Robert Peel
possibly raised the most basic question when he observed that
58the Zulu War was neither na just or necessary war.”
The speech by Lilke on his motion was given two days 
after that of Lord Lansdown in the House of Lords. Congrat­
ulated afterwards by men from both sides of the aisle, he
59called it his 111 greatest success.fn Lilke*s basic line of
55Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, The Life of 
the Rtv Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke (2 vols.; New York:
Macmillan Company, 1917), I, 271-72. Hereinafter referred 
to as Gwynn and Tuckwell, Lilke.
56Great Britain. Hansard*s Parliamentary Lebates. 3rd 
ser., Vol. 244 (3 March-28 March, 1879;, col. 1365. Herein­
after referred to as Hansard.
^Gwynn and Tuckwell, Lilke, 273.
^^Hansard, 3rd ser.. Vol. 244 (3 March-28 March, 1879). 
cols. 1620, 167£-73, 2022.
Gwynn and Tuckwell, Lilke. 274-75.
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thought was summed up in the question: ”Was it not the more
prudent course to follow, instead of exhibiting a knight-
errand boldness, for an English statesman to act in a spirit
60of watchful care?” Joseph Chamberlain was opposed to the
new imperialism that Frere and Chelmsford represented, because
61of the onerous responsibility it would impose. Practicable
points were made: Natal had taken prisoners from Zululand
by force before (in reference to the two women); and the
two surveyors were military spies, Frere having already
decided on invasion. One member considered Frere too partial
to missionaries. In his opinion, "they should not be under
the impression that the country was prepared to spend blood
6 2and treasure in assisting them, wherever they might go.”
The Marquis of Salisbury had reiterated the case of the 
Government in the Lords by saying that the Government did not 
want to question the policy of Sir Eartle Frere in the middle 
of a war; they did want him to understand that ”Her Majesty1s 
Advisers, and they only, must decide the grave issues of peace 
and war.” Salisbury could not help but admire Frere and 
added a postscript that characterized his own policy years 
later, namely that rules of normal diplomacy did not always 
apply in areas such as South Africa. The formula that had
^°Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 244 (3 March-28 March,
1879), col. 1885.
61Ibid, col. 1916.
62I*>id. cols. 1877-78, 2087-88.
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made the Empire great and would continue to do so was "bold-
63ness, boldness, and always boldness.”
Sir Bartle Frere rendered Bis own defense in a dis­
patch to Hicks-Beach on 30 June 1879. He described himself 
as captain of a ship caught at sea in a hurricane. On shore, 
the owners of the ship were trying to direct the captain’s 
movements, a rather impossible situation; but it was what 
the people of Britain were trying to do with their colonial 
administrators. On the practical side, Frere complained of 
the lack of consideration given by the boundary commission 
to the welfare of the Boer families in the lands awarded to 
the Zulus. ”1 made,” he wrote, ”such provision as I thought 
would be adequate to secure the rights of property of civil­
ised men.” The other reason for imposing the demands on the 
Zulus, Frere contended, was the murder of the two women 
dragged across the Natal border. "They were human beings, 
who had managed to escape into British territory, and there 
believed themselves to be, (as we should, if asked, have told 
them they were) protected by British law and by the determin­
ation of British men, that British power should be employed 
to its upmost to defend those under British protection, and 
enforce British law." The description Frere gave of Cetewayo 
as "a blood-thirsty barbarian, utterly opposed to European
63Ibid. cols. 1679-80.
Salisbury was Prime Minister three times, beginning 
in 1885. Chamberlain was the Colonial Secretary in his last 
cabinet (1895-1902). Ensor, England« 608-11.
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civilized ideas and ways" was everything Frere had ever
64.
fought against*
The most stinging criticism of the policy enunciated
by Frere in Afghanistan and South Africa came from Gladstone
during his Midlothian campaigns in Scotland in 1879 and 
661880,  ^ described as the "best summary of the Liberal doctrine
66
on world policy." He deprecated the annexation of the 
Transvaal, noting that 6,500 of its 8,000 electors had signed 
a petition against it. The Zulus had acted as patriots, only 
to be mowed down by the best weapons European science could 
supply. The actions taken in both South Africa and Afghan­
istan were wrong:
V/e had no business to go there with these gratuitous 
and unnecessary difficulties, disturbing confidence, 
perplexing business, unsettling the fabric of civilised 
society through the world. We had no business to take 
those engagements when our hands were full. But I 
contend, also that the engagements were bad; and that 
being bad, we ought not to have undertaken them, even 
if our hands, instead of being full, had been perfectly 
empty.67
The election that was fought in Britain in 1880 was 
a victory for Gladstone and the Liberals, but it had results 
unforeseen at that time. The recall of Sir Bartle Frere in
64.\B, S. P., "Further Correspondence Respecting the 
Affairs of South Africa," LIV, 1878-1879, C.-2454, Ho. 54 
(30 June 1879), 298-99, 302-03.
^Ensor, England, 63-64.
^Thornton, Idea, 43.
E, Gladstone, Midlothian Speeches, 1879 (Hew 
York: Humanities Press, 1971), 48-49, 91, 63.
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August 1880, after the concept of confederation had been 
rejected by the Cape Parliament, led to a Boer revolt.
Neither was the Transvaal disannexed as Gladstone had wanted, 
nor was it given the self-government under the Crown that 
Frere envisioned; the Transvaal was given independence, and 
the dropping of the word "suzerainty” (over the Boers by the 
British) by the Convention of London in 1884 led to another 
twenty years of strife. On the other hand, Gladstone's 
Midlothian speeches showed he did not yet comprehend that 
the tenet of imperialism could not be held back, for it was 
already a "public state of mind in Europe.” Joseph 
Chamberlain soon reflected such a state of mind. In his 
opinion, political and economic control were one. He con­
ceived of the Foreign and Colonial Offices as seekers of new 
markets and protectors of the old ones. If reminded that 
commerce with British colonies was not vital to the mother 
country, Chamberlain would expound Britain’s role as trustee 
and propagator of civilization. His colonial policy was
quite simple: keep current possessions, covet what looked
69good for the future, and fight anyone who disagreed.
The Liberals themselves were unable to stop the 
imperialist advance, and the imperialists looked for any 
chance to damage their foe. The best chance came with the
^Ensor, England. 64, 68-69.
^Thornton, Idea. 43, 104-05, 99-100.
10:i
70"khaki election" of 1900, twenty years after Midlothian.
But the true strength of the imperial impulse was shown with
the annexation of the two Boer republics— Orange Free State
and Transvaal— in the early 1900s. As John Strachey has
pointed out however, it was not so much the accomplishment
of Rhodes and Chamberlain as of Sir Alfred Milner, the
71administrator, with his unequaled determination. Appointed
to his post as High Commissioner for South Africa in 1897,
Milner had been imbued with the imperialist spirit as a
result of working with Cromer in Egypt and observing the
72benefits of British rule. British colonial policy had come 
full circle and Milner, the administrator, had succeeded 
where Frere, the administrator, had failed. The idea for 
which Frere had fought had become a reality.
There is another question to answer, namely Frerefs 
place in history. Sir Reginald Copeland has ranked Frere 
among the three ablest men sent to South Africa by the 
British Government, Sir George Grey and Viscount Milner 
being the other two. He even thought it possible that with 
success in Zululand Frere could have avoided the continued
7 rz
strife in South Africa. Whether or not this was possible 
70Ibid, 46-47.
^Strachey, The End of Empire. 91.
72Ensor, England, 245*
7^Sir Reginald Coupland, Zulu Battle Piece: 
Isandhlwana (London: John Murray, 1896), 133-54*
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at the time, Erere earned the ingratitude of an experienced 
colonial administrator of the day, Lord Blachford. The latter 
complained that Erere had no idea as to how colonial govern­
ment was conducted, conceiving his ignorance to be "superior 
k n o w l e d g e * I n  a way, Lord Blachford was right, for as 
another writer has explained, Erere "belonged to the new
generation of imperialists announced by Livingstone and
75realized by Chamberlain." They did not want to know about
the old way of handling colonial affairs; they already had
their program. Some years, later, Cecil Rhodes spoke of how
new states had been carved out in South Africa, and how the
Afrikander Bond had tried to alleviate differences between
them. One excerpt is very enlightening:
I might say there is no difference between the policy 
of Sir Bartle Erere and the policy of the Afrikander Bond. 
If that had been stated at the time Sir Bartle Erere was 
Governor of the Cape Colony, it would have been met with 
laughter; but now you receive the statement in all serious­
ness, recognizing its truth. People are beginning to see 
that this is the grand central idea.
He had also said six years earlier that the "union l o t  South
Africa/ is not to be reached as the late Sir Bartle Erere
77wanted to reach to Zambesi— all in a minute.”
"^George Eden Marindin, Letters of Erederic Lord 
Blachford (London: John Murray,. 1896) , 394. '
^ D e  Kiewiet, Imperial, 127#
^Vindex /E. Tetschoyle/, Cecil Rhodes: His Political
Life and Speeches (London: Chapman and Hal1,1900), 269.
77Ibid. 114.
CONCLUSION
The roots of Victorian imperialism are to be found, 
to a considerable degree, in British India, and it was there 
that its character was largely molded. One of the most 
prominent characteristics of Victorian imperialism was the 
emphasis on civilized progress. Public works, a basic human 
endeavor, were a good example of that principle. They were 
carried out for the benefit of the people of India. The 
British administrator, as exemplified by Sir Bartle Prere, 
was pragmatic about them. Roads, he theorized, led to trade, 
and trade to a better life for the Indians. Humanistic feel- 
ings were also a factor in public works. As an adminis­
trator, Prere saw no problem in combining the two factors.
No compulsion was placed on the natives by the emphasis on 
public works; instead, British administration v/as providing 
the basis on which the Indians would construct a new and 
better India. In large part, the administrators were success­
ful, as they laid the foundation for m o d e m  industry in India. 
They erred, however, by touching on Indian sensibilities.
It was this mistake that led to the Indian Mutiny in 1857, 
which transferred governmental power from the old East India 
Company to the British Government. The Mutiny resulted in
^Supra, 7-9#
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power steadily becoming concentrated in London, racial
antagonism between the British and Indians, and a dislike
2
among the British for further reform.
The concentration of power in London, racial antagon­
ism, and the loss of a sense of mission which was evident 
among many Britons in India after the Mutiny did not affect 
Sir Bartle Prere. His attitude was a reflection of his 
training in the Sind, where the emphasis had been on indiv­
idual initiative and personal relationships with the Indians. 
This persuaded him to fight for the governing of British 
India in India itself and against racial discrimination in 
government. He opposed, for instance, the ideas of Canning 
for realigning his executive council and also the Arms Bill 
of 1860. Prere never lost his sense of mission; this was 
reiterated when he lectured to the Indian upper classes and 
university students about their responsibilities for India.^
As with public works, however, British administration provided 
only the frame of the house; the structure would have to be 
built by the Indians themselves. The British provided the 
superior moral and political leadership for the Indians, as 
Prere had been taught at the training college at Haileybury.
In summary, the hallmarks of Indian administration as exem­
plified by Prere were free trade, individual initiative in 
administration, personal contact with the natives, and super-
2Supra, 19# ^Supra. 25-28, 31-32.
^Supra, 38-39# ^Supra. 1#
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ior moral and political leadership. All these factors were 
present to one degree or another in the areas— Afghanistan 
and Africa— where Prere later took an imperialist stance.
Afghanistan provided the first instance of contention 
between the imperialist, or "forward school," and, in this 
case, the group favoring status quo headed by John Lawrence. 
The problem was how to keep Afghanistan out of Russian hands. 
Sir Bartle Prere emphasized two arguments in advocating a 
forward policy. He wanted a British agent to deal personally 
with the Afghan ruler and thus reduce the chance of undue 
Russian influence on him. The agent was also to insist on 
protection for British commercial interests. John Lawrence, 
on the other hand, favored a less ambitious policy whereby
7
India would be defended on its own border, if the need arose. 
It was essentially the same "imperial vs. anti-imperial" 
argument that erupted again when the South African policy 
pursued by Prere was attacked by British Liberals. The major 
difference in earlier arguments between Prere and Lawrence 
over Afghanistan was that they involved two Indian adminis­
trators who were experts in their field. Their arguments 
therefore were of a highly technical nature, the implications 
of which did not appear until Lord Lytton became Viceroy and 
Governor-General. By this time Prere was in South Africa, 
and events there began to parallel those in Afghanistan,
^Supra, 51-52. ^Supra. 5 4 *
n o
where the new Viceroy was taking an aggressive stance. Both 
cases were decided on the basis of Indian administrative 
experience.
The mission of Sir Bartle Frere to Zanzibar had a 
more direct link with India than his service in South AfriGa. 
The reason for the mission was the Turkish threat to the 
Persian G-ulf, an area the British considered a special sphere 
of influence; indirectly it menaced British rule in India 
because of the religious significance of the Sultan of 
Constantinople. It was to forestall this threat that colon­
ial administrators suggested forcing the Sultan of Zanzibar 
to ban the slave trade in his far-flung East African empire. 
They sought to reconstruct an old alliance between the 
British and the progressive mercantile elements and prevent
o
any intrusion of hostile powers. The argument made by Frere 
that free trade would compensate for the loss of the slave 
trade was natural because of his Indian background. The use 
of a consular system to keep the slave trade in check, and 
missionary groups to establish personal rapport and advance 
civilized behavior among the released slaves was also in 
keeping with his Indian experiences. More important, however, 
was his belief in the superior moral and political leadership 
of Britain in providing for the advancement of the Africans. 
This, in the end, was the basis for his contention that free
^Supra, 60-62.
Ill
/
trade would adequately compensate for abolition of the slave 
trade by Zanzibar.
The same basic belief in the superior moral and 
political leadership that Britain could provide for uncivil­
ized peoples underlay the actions taken by Sir Bartle Prere 
which led to the Zulu War. He expressed the certainty that 
he was right in the dispatches he sent back to the Colonial
Q
Office; if he was not, his entire career had been a waste.
Prere constructed his edifice upon that base. He envisioned
a British resident able to work on a personal basis with
Cetewayo.1^ An incident such as the dragging of the two
women back across the Natal border by the Zulus gave Prere
a good illustration of the need for such moral and political
leadership.11 G-ladstone was correct in linking events in
Afghanistan and South Africa. They were cut from the same
cloth, and signaled the rise of the imperialist spirit that
would culminate with such politicians as Joseph Chamberlain.
It was another administrator, Viscount Milner, who, imbued
with the imperial ideal, effectively carried British influence
12all the way north to the Zambesi.
The inevitable conclusion is that the British Indian 
administrator was the decisive factor in the formation of 
Victorian imperialism. Prere had been instrumental in revers­
ing British policy in Afghanistan, Eastern Africa, and South
9Supra. 98-99. 10Supra. 98.
l:LSupra. 96-97. 12Supra. 105.
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Africa* The British cleared Afghanistan of Russian influence, 
kept East Africa in the British sphere of influence, and 
prepared the way for South African confederation.
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